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COUNSEL FOR THE DIVORCE 
REBECCA AVIEL* 
Abstract: This article challenges the legal profession’s foundational assumption 
that legal services must be delivered in an adversarial posture, with lawyers com-
pelled to engage in robust partisan advocacy on behalf of their clients’ individual-
ized interests. This narrow conception of the lawyer’s role is particularly inapt in 
family law because many divorcing spouses actually seek joint counsel, under-
standing that they have profound shared interests in minimizing transaction costs, 
maximizing the value of the marital estate, and reducing the hostility and animos-
ity that are so harmful to children. Couples who wish to advance these interests 
by retaining joint counsel are poorly served by the profession’s insistence that 
they each retain their own lawyer or forego legal representation altogether. This 
binary choice, while justified by reference to seemingly beneficent notions of 
undivided loyalty, turns out to be costly, paternalistic, and willfully unresponsive 
to changing realities in the market for legal services. 
INTRODUCTION 
The legal profession has made it all but impossible to unbundle partisan 
advocacy from legal representation. In spite of repeated invitations to embrace 
the potential of the problem-solving lawyer whose expertise and creativity can 
add value for clients in non-adversarial ways,1 the bar continues to treat as 
self-evident the proposition that clients who want legal assistance must obtain 
it from someone who can offer vigorous, even zealous advocacy, promoting 
the client’s individualized goals from a vantage point unhindered by other con-
siderations. Justified by reference to vague ideals of loyalty and undivided 
commitment, the assumption seems like a beneficent one, something that pro-
tects clients from pernicious conflicts of interest. Upon closer inspection, how-
ever, the insistence that legal advice be delivered in an adversarial posture 
turns out to be costly, paternalistic, and willfully unresponsive to changing re-
alities in the market for legal services. 
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 * Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. 
 1 See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1250 (2008); Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and Non-
Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 785–86 (1999). Perhaps the earliest and most 
prominent example is that of Justice Louis Brandeis, who famously defended his representation of 
multiple parties on the grounds that he acted not as a traditional partisan advocate but as “counsel for 
the situation.” See John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple 
Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 742–43.  
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Nowhere are these consequences more pronounced than in the area of 
family law. The legal profession offers surprisingly little to divorcing spouses 
who seek assistance in a form other than the classic model of full-fledged rep-
resentation.2 The paucity of alternatives is particularly unsatisfying when 
viewed in light of the tremendous changes that have occurred in the law of 
marital dissolution. In particular, the substantive legal rules that govern divorce 
have undergone a revolution in the past forty years, transforming divorce from 
a fault-based inquiry suitable for adversarial resolution to a process best char-
acterized as the judicial restructuring of finances and relationships.3 No longer 
do courts determine who was at fault for the breakdown of a marriage, and 
then issue financial awards that can be analogized to damages for breach of the 
marital contract; nor do custody contests regularly result in one parent being 
identified as the sole or primary custodian while the other is relegated to visita-
tion.4 Instead, courts focus on the equitable distribution of marital resources 
and strive for an allocation of parental responsibility that keeps both parents 
significantly involved wherever possible.5 Tracking these substantive devel-
opments, family courts have embraced procedural and structural changes that 
seek to make divorce faster, cheaper, and less acrimonious, such as early neu-
tral evaluation by court employees, mandatory mutual financial disclosures, 
and other case management mechanisms uniquely tailored to the domestic re-
lations context.6 Despite these profound transformations in family law, many 
divorce clients encounter an all-or-nothing choice when seeking legal services: 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See ABA HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE 9 (noting that the majority of 
lawyers offer clients “an all (full-service) or nothing (wholly unrepresented) Hobson’s ‘choice’”). 
 3 See Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody Disputes: From Fault 
Finder to Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 395, 
397 (2000). 
 4 See Lawrence M. Friedman, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 380–81, 577–78 (3d ed. 2005) 
(describing the traditional fault-based system); Judith G. McMullen & Debra Oswald, Why Do We 
Need a Lawyer?: An Empirical Study of Divorce Cases, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 57, 61 (2010) (“The 
esoteric and complex nature of the necessary claims made it almost a necessity to hire a lawyer to 
provide guidance through the process.”). 
 5 Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Postdivorce Family: Implications of a Paradigm 
Shift, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 363, 365 (2009) (noting the “commitment to shared parenting” that “is re-
flected not only in the increasingly common statutory preference for post-divorce custody arrange-
ments that facilitate close and continuing contact with both parents, but also in the parenting arrange-
ments actually produced”). 
 6 See, e.g., Family Law Facilitator Act, 14 CAL. FAM. CODE, § 10013 (2000); see also Yishai 
Boyarin, Court-Connected ADR: A Time of Crisis, a Time of Change, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 377, 377–78 
(2012); Francis L. Harrison et al., California’s Family Law Facilitator Program: A New Paradigm for 
the Courts, 2 J. CTR. CHILD. & CTS. 61, 61 (2000); Peter Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family 
Court Services: The Beginning of the End for Mandatory Mediation?, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 371, 371 
(2009); Peter Salem et al., Taking Stock of Parent Education in the Family Courts: Envisioning a 
Public Health Approach, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 131, 131 (2013); CALIFORNIA COURTS: THE JUDICIAL 
BRANCH OF CALIFORNIA, http://www.courts.ca.gov/programs.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/4UZ2-
ZE6E (last visited Aug. 29, 2013). 
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either full-scale zealous advocacy in the adversarial tradition or self-repre-
sentation.7 
Such a binary choice is troublesome on multiple dimensions, with the 
most obvious being cost. Most divorcing families cannot realistically fund two 
lawyers out of one marital pot. By some estimates, 60–90% of domestic rela-
tions cases involve at least one unrepresented party.8 Many scholars and activ-
ists frame the issue as an access to justice problem that should be solved by the 
judicial or legislative recognition of a categorical right to counsel at public ex-
pense.9 Setting aside the practical obstacles to such a solution, the financial 
downsides of the full-scale model affect a wide range of couples beyond those 
indigent enough to qualify for publicly funded counsel. Where both lawyers 
are getting paid out of a finite set of marital assets, every dollar spent on legal 
fees inures to the detriment of both spouses, who will share a depleted resource 
after the lawyers have been paid.10 Speaking strictly in financial terms,11 this is 
justifiable only from the point of view of an individual spouse who expects 
that his lawyer’s zealous advocacy will result in an award that more than off-
sets that client’s share of the lawyer’s fees.12 Except in those rare instances in 
                                                                                                                           
 7 As explained below, the collaborative law model, while an important innovation that serves 
some families quite well, is much closer to traditional zealous advocacy than is at first apparent. See 
infra notes 115–123 and accompanying text. 
 8 ABA Standing Comm. on the Delivery of Legal Services, Resolution No. 108 (2013), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/delivery_legal_services/ls_del_unbundling_
resolution_108.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Y93R-XYDQ; see also Julie MacFar-
lane, The National Self-Represented Litigants Project: Identifying and Meeting the Needs of Self-
Represented Litigants, Final Report May 2013, at 41, available at http://representingyourselfcanada.
files.wordpress.com/2014/02/reportm15-2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GL4Y-S7TK (qualitative 
study gathering data on self-represented litigants in three Canadian provinces). 
 9 See generally Debra Gardner, Justice Delayed Is, Once Again, Justice Denied: The Overdue 
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 59 (2007); Wade Henderson, Keynote Address: 
The Evolution and Importance of Creating a Civil Right to Counsel, 25 TOURO L. REV. 71, 76–78 
(2009); Joan Grace Ritchey, Limits on Justice: The United States’ Failure to Recognize a Right to 
Counsel in Civil Litigation, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 317, 338 (2001). 
 10 See Mark P. Gergen, A Thoroughly Modern Theory of Restitution, 84 TEX. L. REV. 173, 186 
(2005), (reviewing HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION (2004) (quoting Profes-
sor Jack Sampson, who estimates that “combined legal fees to divide a marital estate of $500,000 
run[] between 5% and 10% of the estate”)). Even where the court orders one spouse to pay the other’s 
attorney fees, the expenditure is still inextricably bound in the settlement of the marital estate. See 
BARBARA GLESNER FINES, ETHICAL ISSUES IN FAMILY REPRESENTATION 17 (2010) (advising that 
attorneys may request fees either during the preliminary stages of an action or at end of the proceed-
ing, including fees in the final distribution of property and debts). 
 11 Divorcing spouses may seek legal representation to protect a range of interests that cannot be 
monetized, such as custody of their children and protection from domestic violence. 
 12 See Sarah C. Acker, All’s Fair in Love and Divorce: Why Divorce Attorney’s Fees Should 
Constitute a Dissipation of Marital Assets in Order to Retain Equity in Marital Property Distribu-
tions, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 147, 157 (2006) (“Payment of attorney’s fees from mari-
tal assets can solely benefit the expending spouse. . . . The attorney only protects the interests of the 
hiring spouse regarding the financial division of the estate and in the non-financial matters of securing 
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which both lawyers are adding value to the marital pot in an amount that ex-
ceeds what their fees withdraw from it, this expectation cannot simultaneously 
bear fruit for both spouses, creating a sort of prisoner’s dilemma. 
Couples who can acknowledge and act upon shared financial interests 
would certainly benefit from reducing the amount of legal fees expended on the 
divorce. Even individual spouses, however, who gauge their interests in a com-
petitive rather than cooperative manner and believe that they deserve a larger 
share of the marital assets than their spouses, could benefit from minimizing le-
gal fees.13 Given how expensive legal assistance has become, a significant num-
ber of divorcing individuals may find that the financial gain attributed to a zeal-
ous advocate is insufficient to offset the cost of paying that advocate, even where 
half the cost is borne by the other spouse.14 
Even for couples that can afford it, hiring two lawyers may inject an un-
appealing adversarial dynamic into the proceeding.15 It is tempting to assume 
that in light of their marital failure, all divorcing spouses desire the assistance 
of a partisan advocate, loyal only to their individual interests, who will protect 
them from unfavorable outcomes. Some divorcing spouses, however, prioritize 
conflict avoidance and expeditious resolution above the maximization of fi-
nancial awards or parenting time.16 Divorce cases in which both parties are 
                                                                                                                           
the actual divorce. The result is that one spouse benefits from expending marital funds when he or she 
uses those funds to protect individual interests in the divorce and property division.”). 
 13 See Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 407, 414–15 (1998) (“Even 
when clients are antagonists, the potential benefits that an aggressive, unconflicted lawyer might 
achieve on behalf of a client may be less than the expense of the additional representation. Thus, for 
example, both parties to a divorce proceeding may prefer to divide their community resources using 
the advice of a single lawyer even though the advice may serve one client better than the other.”); see 
also MacFarlane, supra note 8, at 41 (observing that some self-represented litigants have made “a 
simple cost/benefit assessment and concluded that by saving legal costs they will still come out ahead, 
even if they recover less in dollars than they might with legal representation”). 
 14 See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR 
COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 30 (1986). The financial disincentive to obtaining legal coun-
sel complicates what is generally conceived of as “the central, inescapable tension between coopera-
tive moves to create value jointly and competitive moves to gain individual advantage.” Id. 
 15 See McMullen & Oswald, supra note 4, at 58 (noting that “divorce litigants choose self-
representation for non-financial as well as financial reasons”); Andrew Schepard, Tragedy and Hope, 
40 FAM. CT. REV. 5, 6 (2002) (observing that a “growing numbers of people who use family courts 
simply do not want or trust lawyers to serve their best interests even when they can afford them”).  
 16 A study conducted by the California state court system concluded: “There is strong reason to 
believe that much of the accepted wisdom concerning self-represented litigants is flawed. Their arrival 
in the domestic relations courts has probably reduced the number of hearings, shortened those that 
occur, and reduced the time required to dispose of cases. For the most part, it appears that persons 
choosing to represent themselves are making rational and accurate assessments that their cases are not 
complex enough to warrant retaining counsel.” John M. Greacen, Self Represented Litigants and 
Court and Legal Services Responses to Their Needs: What We Know, at 32 (2002), http://
www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/SRLwhatweknow.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/P7NN-
C4DV?type=pdf. 
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represented by lawyers take much longer to resolve than pro se cases,17 a mate-
rial difference where parties place a premium on “getting on with their lives” 
and repeatedly express frustration with their divorce cases “dragging on.”18 
Yet even those divorcing spouses who seek a smooth and relatively ami-
cable process might very well benefit from legal guidance. A lawyer can ex-
plain the legal principles that govern marital dissolution—e.g., the difference 
between separate property and marital property—and determine how those 
principles apply to their circumstances.19 A lawyer can identify the tax implica-
tions of particular financial distributions and propose alternatives that maxim-
ize the value of the marital estate. A lawyer can draft individualized documents 
that better memorialize the details of the couple’s agreement than the standard 
forms available through the state court system. There is ample room in in fami-
ly law for expertise without advocacy, for the exercise of legal judgment and 
skill without full-fledged partisan loyalty to an individual client. 
Reformers and scholars who focus on the movement towards unbundled 
legal services understand that family law urgently needs a wider range of alter-
natives than full service or self-representation.20 Some progress has been made 
in acknowledging and embracing limited scope representation, in which law-
yer and client agree to limit the range of legal services the lawyer will pro-
vide.21 A particular form of unbundled legal services, however, is conspicuous-
ly absent from the scholarly discourse or the market offerings: the joint repre-
sentation of amicably divorcing spouses by a single lawyer.22 This model 
seems to have been written off as a per se conflict of interest, perhaps under-
standably given the origin of divorce as an adversarial contest, and the acrimo-
                                                                                                                           
 17 See Greacen, supra note 16, at 11. One study showed that dissolutions involving children took 
136 days if both parties were unrepresented and 345 days if both parties had attorneys. McMullen & 
Oswald, supra note 4, at 59 (“Our data showed that divorces tended to take longer when the litigants 
were represented by lawyers. This extra time is likely partly or mostly due to the greater complexity of 
issues in cases where lawyers were employed, but it is also possible that lawyers increase the length of 
the process either deliberately or by virtue of their characteristic methods of practice.”). 
 18 See McMullen & Oswald, supra note 4, at 69 (“Divorce is a painful process for most couples, 
and it seems reasonable to assume that most clients would prefer to get through it as quickly as possi-
ble.”). 
 19 For example, a lawyer can explain the fairly technical procedure for distributing portions of a 
non-vested pension to the former spouse of the employee. 1-4 VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF 
MARITAL PROPERTY § 4.10(4) (briefly explaining the Qualified Domestic Relations Order). 
 20 See, e.g., Marsha M. Mansfield & Louise G. Trubek, New Roles to Solve Old Problems: Law-
yering for Ordinary People in Today’s Context, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 367, 368–69 (2011). 
 21 See generally Stephanie Kimbro, Using Technology to Unbundle in the Legal Services Com-
munity, HARV. J.L. & TECH. OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, Feb. 2013, at 1, 1–2, available at http://jolt.
law.harvard.edu/symposium/articles/Kimbro-UsingTechnologytoUnbundleLegalServices.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/S4D8-2JVR (examining the different methods of unbundling legal services that 
have been developed and the use of technology to unbundle legal services). 
 22 Interestingly, this reaction conflicts with the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 
which takes the context-specific, informed consent approach that I advocate here. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. g, illus. 8 (2000). 
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ny and conflict—both legal and emotional—that still characterize many di-
vorces.23 Nevertheless, scholars and practitioners should reconsider the cate-
gorical rejection of this model.24 Joint representation certainly will not work 
for everyone, a point this Article will explore in detail and emphasize repeated-
ly, but it adds an important alternative for a certain subset of divorcing couples, 
with benefits that cannot be obtained in any other fashion.25 
This Article first identifies the current options available to divorcing 
spouses and explains why they are each inadequate. Building on previous re-
search in this area,26 Part I of this Article asserts that full-scale zealous advoca-
cy in the adversarial tradition is an increasingly inapt and irrelevant model for 
family law.27 
Part II describes the experience of most families, who navigate the disso-
lution process without any legal representation.28 During mediation, divorcing 
couples often encounter a neutral facilitator who can help them settle their af-
fairs without litigation.29 As valuable as this may be, however, self-represented 
parties do not have access to legal advice during the mediation process.30 First, 
many of these mediators are not lawyers, and are thus prohibited from engag-
ing in what would be the unauthorized practice of law.31 Second, even for 
those mediators who are attorneys licensed to practice law, a variety of differ-
ent constraints prohibit them from offering legal advice or drafting legal doc-
uments, severely circumscribing the assistance they can offer to self-
represented parties.32 
Part III examines the increasingly important middle ground of limited 
scope representation.33 This Part surveys the various forms of representation, 
including the family law-specific version of collaborative law, and notes that 
for all of these options, as currently conceived, divorcing spouses would each 
have to hire their own attorney.34 In addition to the obvious financial ramifica-
tions, this choice has important communicative and emotional consequences 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Vinson v. Vinson, 588 S.E. 2d 392, 398 (Va. Ct. App. 2003); Utah State Bar Ethics Advi-
sory Op. Comm., Op. 05-03 (2005). 
 24 See infra notes 209–229 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 154, 203–204, 207–08, 224 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 46–63 and accompanying text.  
 27 See infra notes 46–73 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 74–103 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
 32 See Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the 
Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2006–11 (1999); infra notes 
83–103 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 104–133 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 104–133 and accompanying text. 
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that have not been adequately explored in the literature.35 Engaging an attor-
ney—even for limited purposes—who represents only the individual interests 
of the hiring spouse has a signaling effect that, even if unintentional and inac-
curate, may be fatal to the speedy and harmonious dissolution some divorcing 
couples are hoping to achieve.36 
Finally, Part IV analyzes the joint representation alternative. This Part 
demonstrates that there is present demand for such a model, and that some evi-
dence suggests that this is in fact already happening.37 Driven underground by 
the commonly held assumption that such an arrangement is per se unethical, 
these cases involve a lawyer formally representing one of the spouses while 
the other is unrepresented,38 something that may superficially satisfy ethical 
rules but is likely the worst of all worlds in effectuating the values the rules 
purport to protect. Having demonstrated a demand for joint representation, this 
Article then confronts the most obvious obstacle to such a model: can it possi-
bly be consistent with the profession’s obligation to avoid conflicts of inter-
est?39 
This Part suggests that the fairest way to answer that question is against 
the backdrop of the ethically troublesome alternatives, but it also examines the 
issue on its own terms.40 This Part identifies substantive and procedural princi-
ples in the law of marital dissolution that are central to evaluating the possibil-
ity that divorcing spouses can be jointly represented without running afoul of 
the conflicts rules.41 Using these principles, this Part distinguishes between 
couples who might benefit from joint representation and those for whom it 
would be inappropriate and impermissible, and explores how a lawyer might 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See infra notes 104–133 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 104–133 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 134–150 and accompanying text. 
 38 See Lisa Guerin, Divorce in Oklahoma: Frequently Asked Questions, DIVORCENET, http://
www.divorcenet.com/states/oklahoma/ok_faq01, archived at http://perma.cc/54FS-LGXM (last visit-
ed Aug. 28, 2014) (observing, in response to the question whether one attorney can represent both 
spouses, that “[m]ost attorneys will represent only one party in a divorce action to avoid possible 
conflicts of interest [but] an attorney can draft the decree of divorce according to the agreement that 
you and your spouse have made, and allow your spouse to review the decree of divorce and approve 
it, prior to presenting it to the court for approval.”); Lee Borden, Uncontested Divorce, DIVORCEINFO, 
http://www.divorceinfo.com/uncontesteddivorce.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/3W9T-C4TA (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2014) (defining uncontested divorce as one in which one spouse is represented and 
the other is not); David Wolkowitz, Uncontested Divorce: A Lawyer’s Role, 
http://wolkowitz.com/498/uncontested-divorce-affordabe-evanston-schaumburg-chicago, archived at 
http://perma.cc/62R4-X5BF (last visited Aug. 28, 2014) (asserting that one lawyer is “more than 
enough” for an uncontested divorce, but asserting that having one lawyer represent both parties is “a 
very bad idea”). 
 39 See infra notes 151–229 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 151–229 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 151–229 and accompanying text. 
1106 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1099 
realistically ascertain into which category prospective clients fall.42 Observing 
that our existing framework for evaluating conflicts of interest demands a case-
by-case approach, this Article asserts that divorcing couples should be treated 
no differently than other prospective clients who seek joint representation.43 
Treating them as categorically excluded from joint representation unnecessari-
ly emphasizes their status as divorcing spouses, obscuring the significant set of 
interests they may share.44 Finally, the Article argues that commitment to cli-
ent-centered representation, respect for client autonomy, and humility about 
the legal profession’s competence to pre-judge the actual interests of divorcing 
families militate in favor of the transparent, responsible, and regulated practice 
of joint representation.45 
I. FULL REPRESENTATION IN THE ADVERSARIAL PARADIGM 
The traditional model of full legal representation is predicated on the 
norm of aggressive partisanship in an adversarial system, obligating lawyers to 
put forth every effort in pursuit of the client’s interests. Lord Broughton’s oft-
invoked description of the attorney-client relationship describes the primacy of 
zealous advocacy: 
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in 
all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all 
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, 
and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in per-
forming this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the de-
struction which he may bring upon others.46 
Successive codes of professional responsibility have, over the years, ex-
pressed this idea in varying degrees of intensity. The Canons required a lawyer 
to show “entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the mainte-
nance and defense of [the client’s] rights and the exertion of the utmost learn-
ing and ability.”47 The client was “entitled to the benefit of any and every rem-
edy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See infra notes 44, 206–211, 227 and accompanying text. 
 43 See infra notes 200–229 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 209–229 and accompanying text. 
 45 See infra notes 230–233 and accompanying text. 
 46 Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham: Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1213, 1215 (2006) (quoting The Trial of Queen Caroline (1821) 2 Eng. Rep. 3). The idea of zealous 
advocacy shows up in the professional responsibility codes as well. See Anita Bernstein, The Zeal 
Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1165–68 (2006) (discussing the evolution of “zeal” in the 
ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Responsibility). 
 47 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 8, 15 (1908). 
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his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.”48 The current rules of pro-
fessional responsibility reflect a muted yet still distinct version of this ideal.49 
The merits of the adversary system have been the subject of much debate, 
and revisiting the topic in any depth is beyond the scope of this Article.50 What-
ever we might think of the adversary system’s virtues in other legal contexts, 
however, it is an inappropriate mechanism for resolving the issues that attend the 
dissolution of a marriage. The adversary system imposes emotional and financial 
costs that are precisely contrary to the interests that family law is intended to 
serve. 
Protecting the well-being of children of the marriage constitutes one of 
the chief concerns of any legal framework for divorce. The substantive legal 
principle that governs custody disputes in every jurisdiction requires that cus-
tody orders reflect the best interests of the child.51 As family law scholars re-
peatedly explain, adversarial procedures are uniquely costly and counter-
productive in resolving custody disputes.52 In previous work, I have explained 
that the allocation of rights and responsibilities between a child’s two parents 
is a singular posture in law, presenting concerns that simply do not translate to 
any other form of legal proceeding.53 First, the majority of custody disputes 
result in orders that create some type of joint parenting arrangement after the 
divorce.54 These plans require extensive coordination between the parties: con-
sider, for example, the day-to-day logistics of transporting children between 
households or the cooperation necessary to exercise joint decision-making 
about education or medical treatment.  
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. 
 49 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble (2013). The preamble to the current Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct notes that lawyers perform various functions, acting as advisors, advo-
cates, negotiators, and evaluators. Id. As an advocate, the preamble states, “a lawyer zealously asserts 
the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.” Id. The preamble also notes that the 
“basic principles” underlying the Rules of Professional conduct “include the lawyer’s obligation zeal-
ously to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate interests, within the bounds of the law, while main-
taining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system.” Id.  
 50 For treatment of some of this literature, see Rebecca Aviel, The Boundary Claim’s Caveat: 
Lawyers and Confidentiality Exceptionalism, 86 TULANE L. REV. 1055, 1094–96 (2012). 
 51 See, e.g., Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2003, 
2013 (2014).  
 52 See Rebecca Aviel, Why Civil Gideon Won’t Fix Family Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2106, 2109 n.6 
(2013); Robert F. Cochran Jr., Legal Ethics and Collaborative Practice Ethics, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
537, 539 (2009) (“The adversarial nature of litigation and other existing dispute resolution mecha-
nisms was particularly troubling in family law”); Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, In the Best 
Interests of Children: A Proposal to Transform the Adversarial System, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 203, 205 
(2004); Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and the 
Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 86–100 (1997). 
 53 See Aviel, supra note 52, at 2115–16. 
 54 See id. at 2116, (citing, Singer supra note 5, at 365). 
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Even in divorce cases that do not require such cooperation—where one 
parent will be the primary residential custodian and have exclusive decision-
making authority, for example—the parties must arrive at this result expedi-
tiously and with minimum conflict.55 Social scientists observe that a child’s 
adjustment to divorce and separation depends significantly on their parents’ 
behavior during and after the separation: children exposed to high levels of 
parental conflict experience the most negative effects of family dissolution.56 
Others have explored similar themes, emphasizing the damage custody litiga-
tion does to children and families.57 There is a profound consensus that the 
emotional costs of adversarial custody proceedings are intolerably high. Re-
form efforts in domestic relations courts reflect this understanding: as Profes-
sor Jana Singer observes, courts are undergoing a “paradigm shift” away from 
a “law-oriented and judge-focused adversary model” toward “a more collabo-
rative, interdisciplinary, and forward-looking family dispute resolution re-
gime.”58 
Although the destructive effect of custody litigation on children rightfully 
predominates among critiques of adversarialism in family law,59 multiple rea-
sons remain to question whether full-fledged traditional advocacy is necessary or 
appropriate even for divorcing couples without minor children. Adversarial rep-
resentation is financially untenable on multiple levels: few can afford it, and 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See Singer, supra note 5, at 365. 
 56 See id. 
 57 See Lynn M. Akre, Struggling with Indeterminacy: A Call for Interdisciplinary Collaboration 
in Redefining the “Best Interest of the Child” Standard, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 628, 649 (1992) (“Parental 
conflict is intensified by protracted custody litigation, and the greater the degree of inter-parental 
conflict, the greater the psychological maladjustment of the child.”); Cochran supra note 52, at 539 
(“The adversarial nature of litigation and other existing dispute resolution mechanisms was particular-
ly troubling in family law . . . . There was a growing recognition that children are collateral damage in 
many divorces, especially high conflict divorces.”); Linda Jellum, Parents Know Best: Revising Our 
Approach to Parental Custody Agreements, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 615, 640–41 (2004) (noting that child 
custody litigation harms the emotional health of children and often does not enhance justice); Joan B. 
Kelly, Commentary on “Family Bridges: Using Insights from Social Science to Reconnect Parents 
and Alienated Children” (Warshak, 2010), 48 FAM. CT. REV. 81, 82 (2010) (“[T]here is broad con-
sensus among the mental health and family law community that some older children and adolescents 
do become pathologically alienated from a parent following separation and that the risk of child alien-
ation is increased in highly conflicted separations accompanied by protracted adversarial child custody 
disputes.”) (internal citations omitted); Andrew Schepard et al., Preventing Trauma for Children of 
Divorce Through Education and Professional Responsibility, 16 NOVA L. REV. 767, 770 (1992) (sug-
gesting that divorce-related risks to children increase if parents engage in protracted custody disputes 
and that ongoing parental conflict magnifies normal divorce-related adjustment problems). 
 58 Singer, supra note 5, at 363. 
 59 See Kathryn L. Mercer, A Content Analysis of Judicial Decision-Making—How Judges Use the 
Primary Caretaker Standard to Make a Custody Determination, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 
11 (1998) (“Protracted family law litigation is painful and costly to the parties and the children, so if 
proceedings are fruitless, both human and material resources are wasted.”); Singer, supra note 5, at 
363 (noting that “[a]n overriding theme of recent divorce reform efforts is that adversary processes are 
ill suited for resolving disputes involving children”). 
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even those who can are increasingly choosing not to expend resources in this 
way. By some estimates, in fewer than twenty percent of family law cases does 
each party have their own lawyer.60 In fifty percent of all family law cases, both 
parties are unrepresented.61 Given the soaring cost of legal services and the mea-
ger opportunities for low and middle income Americans to obtain reduced cost 
representation,62 many divorcing couples do not have the resources to pay for one 
lawyer, much less two.63 The expectation that divorcing spouses will be represent-
ed in the traditional fashion—capable advocate pitted against capable advocate, 
each promoting the interests of his or her own client—simply fails to accurately 
portray what happens on the ground.64 
To understand the growing skepticism about full-fledged adversarial ad-
vocacy in divorce cases, however, it is important to emphasize that not all self-
represented litigants choose to proceed pro se because they are unable to afford 
a lawyer. Data concerning the number of pro se litigants who exercise a real 
preference for self-representation is regrettably meager, but it is becoming in-
creasingly clear that a number of divorcing couples just do not want traditional 
legal representation. In an early study, twenty percent of unrepresented divorce 
litigants stated that they were able to afford a lawyer.65 The phenomenon per-
sists in more recent examinations. A leading scholar in family court reform 
notes that “growing numbers of people who use family courts simply do not 
want or trust lawyers to serve their best interests even when they can afford 
                                                                                                                           
 60 A study conducted in Arizona found that by 1991, 88% of all family law cases involved at least 
one pro se litigant. Greacen, supra note 16, at 3. A study conducted in Florida showed that the per-
centage of self-represented litigants increases as the case proceeds, with 85% of all domestic relations 
cases in Miami including at least one self-represented litigant by the end of the case. Id. at 4. An anal-
ysis performed by the San Diego County Superior Court found that 88% of all domestic relations 
cases involved at least on pro se litigant, while similar studies in Van Nuys and Pasadena counties 
found the respective numbers to be 89% and 81%. Id. at 7. 
 61 Madelynn Herman, Self-Representation Pro Se Statistics, Nat’l Ctr. for St. Cts. (Sept. 25, 
2006). 
 62 See Macfarlane, supra note 13, at 39 (“By far the most consistently cited reason for self-
representation was the inability to retain, or to continue to retain, legal counsel.”); Deborah Rhode, 
Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 373 (2004) 
(“[M]illions of Americans who are above poverty thresholds are also priced out of the civil legal pro-
cess for the vast majority of their legal concerns.”). 
 63 See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Again, Still, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1013, 1013 (2004) 
(noting the “shameful irony” that the nation with the most lawyers has among the least adequate sys-
tems for ensuring legal assistance and, even more shamefully, that the inadequacies attract so little 
concern). The current structure fails to meet an estimated four-fifths of the civil legal needs of the 
poor, as well as two to three-fifths of the needs of middle-income individuals. See id. 
 64 This discrepancy undermines the basic assumption that justifies partisan advocacy in an adver-
sarial system, expressed frankly in the Preamble to the Model Rules: “When an opposing party is well 
represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that 
justice is being done.” See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble (2013). 
 65 Robert B. Yegge, Divorce Litigants Without Lawyers, 28 FAM. L.Q. 407, 411 (1994). 
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them.”66 As a former Colorado State Supreme Court justice observed, “there 
are some divorcing couples who don’t want to be told where they might disa-
gree.”67 This observation has borne out elsewhere after extended study. For 
example, following a series of public hearings on Oregon’s divorce system, a 
task force reported that “[m]any pro se litigants can afford lawyers” but do not 
engage their services because “[t]hey fear getting sucked into a vortex of con-
flict.”68 
 Upon reflection we should not be terribly surprised that increasing num-
bers of divorcing spouses find traditional full-fledged representation contrary 
to their interests. No-fault divorce is now available in every state, meaning that 
couples who agree that their marriage should end may achieve this result by 
filing a petition asserting irreconcilable differences.69 There is no need to prove 
that one spouse engaged in specified forms of marital misconduct, or to defend 
against such allegations.70 Instead, the complexity and conflict often reside in 
the custodial and financial issues that attend the dissolution of the marriage. 
For couples without minor children, or who agree upon a post-divorce parent-
ing plan, the distribution of marital assets and liabilities and the possibility of 
post-divorce support payments from one party to the other will likely be the 
source of most intense discord.  
Hiring a zealous advocate to improve one’s financial outcome in a divorce 
proceeding, however, is a risky proposition. It signals to the other spouse that she 
will be disadvantaged if she proceeds without a committed advocate to protect 
her individual interests, and increases the likelihood that each spouse will be 
represented by separate counsel. The funds required to pay these two lawyers 
come from precisely the marital assets whose preferential allocation is the object 
of the representation,71 at the very time the couple is experiencing the financial 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Schepard, supra note 15, at 6. 
 67 Interview with Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis, Colo. Sup. Ct., in Denver, Colo. (Nov. 2012).  
 68 Andrew Schepard, Parental Conflict Prevention Programs and the Unified Family Court: A 
Public Health Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q. 95, 103 (1998) (citing OR. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY LAW, A 
STATUS REPORT 6–7 (1996)). 
 69 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-110(1) (2012). Some states offer a procedure by which 
divorcing spouses may file jointly for dissolution of the marriage. Alternatively, one spouse may file 
the petition with the expectation that the other spouse will not deny that there has been an irretrievable 
breakdown in the marriage. See id. (“If both of the parties by petition or otherwise have stated under 
oath or affirmation that the marriage is irretrievably broken or one of the parties has so stated and the 
other has not denied it, there is a presumption of such fact, and, unless controverted by evidence, the 
court shall, after hearing, make a finding that the marriage is irretrievably broken.”). As scholars and 
courts have both noted, the no-fault regime in practice allows for someone who no longer wants to be 
married to obtain a divorce over the objection of her spouse. 
 70 See id. 
 71 See Alison v. Alison, 864 A.2d 191, 194–97 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (discussing the use of 
marital funds to pay divorce attorneys and collecting cases from other jurisdictions addressing the 
issue); Expenditures for Attorney’s Fees as Dissipation: Spending Marital Funds for Attorney’s Fees, 
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stress of maintaining two households with income that was previously support-
ing just one. As other scholars have recognized, this is exactly the type of situa-
tion where “the potential benefits that an aggressive, unconflicted lawyer might 
achieve on behalf of a client may be less than the expense of the additional rep-
resentation.”72 Lord Brougham’s impassioned pronouncement that advocates 
must promote their own clients’ interests “at all hazards and costs to other per-
sons” makes little sense where these hazards and costs deplete the very financial 
resources the client seeks to obtain. 
Nor is the drain on precious financial resources the only pitfall that cou-
ples may face when they engage two lawyers in the traditional adversarial par-
adigm. These cases typically take twice as long to resolve as cases in which 
both parties are pro se, an astonishing delay given the premium we expect par-
ties to place on resolving a divorce quickly and efficiently.73 Is it any wonder 
that increasing numbers of couples are skeptical about engaging traditional 
partisan advocates to assist with their divorce? Spending ten percent of the 
marital estate to languish in family court twice as long as couples who forgo 
legal representation does not seem like a compelling value proposition. 
The traditional model of full-fledged, individualized partisan advocacy 
has all but become obsolete for family law cases—unaffordable for most cou-
ples and unattractive for many more. Nonetheless, divorce remains a compli-
cated and challenging process with profound and long-lasting consequences. 
Accordingly, legal expertise can be immensely valuable. In the sections that 
follow, this Article explores the existing ways in which divorcing couples can 
navigate the legal process without engaging lawyers in the traditional adversar-
ial paradigm. 
II. SELF-REPRESENTATION WITH THE HELP OF MEDIATORS 
For many unrepresented parties in family court, mediation provides the 
primary point of access to any kind of assistance.74 Family courts increasingly 
require divorcing spouses to participate in mediation, 75 and mediation is estab-
                                                                                                                           
15 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION J. 85 (Aug. 1998) (noting that divorcing spouses typically do not have 
separate funds to pay for legal assistance). 
 72 See Zacharias, supra note 13, at 414–15 (observing that where the benefit of hiring a second 
lawyer is insufficient to offset the additional cost, both parties may prefer to pay for the advice of a 
single lawyer even though it may serve one client more than the other). 
 73 Greacen, supra note 16, at 10. 
 74 See Amy G. Applegate & Connie J.A. Beck, Self-Represented Parties in Mediation: Fifty 
Years Later It Remains the Elephant in the Room, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 87, 87 (2013) (noting the sub-
stantial rise of divorce mediation as an alternative to traditional litigation, and the parallel rise in self-
representation in family law cases). 
 75 See Applegate, supra note 74, at 89 (noting that the best available survey indicated that ten 
states had mandatory attendance clauses, twenty-four states left the referral to a judge’s discretion, 
eight states had mixed referral mechanisms, and the remaining nine states had no statewide statute 
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lishing a strong track record in the resolution of family law disputes.76 To the 
extent that mediation provides families with resolutions that are faster, cheaper, 
and less acrimonious than adversarial litigation, there is much to celebrate, 
although critics have been vocal about the potential for mandatory mediation 
to exacerbate power imbalances between parties.77 While normative questions 
remain about the wisdom of mandatory mediation in certain cases, mediators 
play a truly central role in the resolution of pro se cases. Limits on the services 
they can provide, however, make them inapt substitutes for lawyers. 
A. Non-Lawyer Mediators and Unauthorized Practice 
Mediators need not be licensed attorneys, and many of them are not.78 For 
non-lawyer mediators, providing legal advice or drafting legal documents 
would constitute the unauthorized practice of law.79 I acknowledge and em-
brace the critique that Professor Deborah Rhode80 and others have leveled at 
the bar’s monopolistic use of unauthorized practice laws to protect the legal 
profession’s own self-interest, and I support efforts to reform unauthorized 
practice laws to achieve a better balance between the competing interests at 
stake.81 Doing so, however, will not resolve all the problems associated with 
                                                                                                                           
regarding divorce mediation). In 1980, California was the first to adopt statewide, mandatory media-
tion in all custody disputes and approximately thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia fol-
lowed suit. Boyarin, supra note 6, at 380. 
 76 See Salem et al., supra note 6, at 373–74 (“When compared to adversarial processes, mediation 
results in faster settlement, greater levels of party satisfaction (even when an agreement is not 
reached) and, importantly, improved post-separation family relationships.”). 
 77 See Craig A. Mcewen et al., Bring in The Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to 
Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1336–37 (1995). 
 78 See Robert B. Moberly, Ethical Standards for Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida’s Man-
datory Mediation Experiment, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 702, 720 (1994). 
 79 See Jamie Henikoff & Michael Moffitt, Remodeling the Model Standards of Conduct for Medi-
ators, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 87, 90 n.14 (1997) (“Non-attorney mediators, like all non-attorneys, 
would likely be prohibited from dispensing legal advice because such actions would probably consti-
tute the unauthorized practice of law.”). 
 80 See, e.g., Deborah Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empricial 
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1981) (describing unauthor-
ized practice of law doctrine as “ inconsistent, incoherent, and, from a policy perspective, indefensi-
ble”). 
 81 In Colorado, for example, prohibitions on the services provided by non-lawyer mediators have 
been liberalized somewhat by the Colorado Dispute Resolution Act. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-
302(4), 13-22-308. In the view of the Colorado Bar Association’s Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Section, “[t]he CDRA implies the authorization of non-lawyers to mediate and to draft settlement 
agreements or memoranda of understanding, as they are frequently termed in mediation.” See id.; Best 
Practices for Avoiding Unauthorized Practice of Law in Mediation, 36 COLO. LAW. 25 (2007). Under 
the CDRA, a mediator is “a trained individual who assists disputants to reach a mutually acceptable 
resolution of their disputes by identifying and evaluating alternatives.” § 13-22-302(4). Thus, the 
CDRA implies that a mediator may draft a settlement agreement, to be approved by the parties and 
their attorneys. Because the CDRA does not require a mediator to be a lawyer, it provides statutory 
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relying on mediators as the sole source of legal assistance for divorcing cou-
ples. Even for licensed lawyers, the role of a mediator imposes constraints that 
severely limit the guidance that divorcing couples can hope to obtain, as I ex-
plain in the next sub-section.82 
B. Mediation Ethics and the Constraints on Lawyer Mediators 
The role of a mediator is widely understood to be incompatible with the 
provision of legal advice. Mediator codes in a number of states either limit or 
prohibit mediators from dispensing legal advice,83 as do standards of practice 
crafted specifically for the domestic relations context.84 In 2001, for example, 
the American Bar Association (“ABA”) House of Delegates approved Model 
Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation.85 Standard VI states 
that “[a] family mediator shall structure the mediation process so that the par-
ticipants make decisions based on sufficient information and knowledge.”86 
Ensuring that participants fully understand the consequences of their agree-
ment, which by its very nature will include the waiver of significant rights, is 
without question a laudable goal, one that is essential to the basic fairness of 
mediation.87 The accompanying commentary, however, undercuts this objec-
tive by specifying that a mediator may not offer legal advice.88 Given the fi-
nancial realities confronting so many divorcing families, the tension is hardly 
mitigated by the additional comment instructing mediators to recommend that 
participants obtain independent legal advice before signing an agreement.89 
The reiteration of the prohibition against legal advice in the 2001 Model 
Standards is particularly significant because these standards were the product 
of an exhaustive, collaborative process by the most knowledgeable and influ-
ential actors in the field of family mediation.90 They were self-consciously try-
                                                                                                                           
authority for a non-lawyer mediator to draft a settlement agreement. See Best Practices for Avoiding 
Unauthorized Practice of Law in Mediation, 36 COLO. LAW. 25 (2007). 
 82 See infra notes 83–103 and accompanying text. 
 83 See, e.g., MASS. UNIF. R. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION 9(c)(iv) (noting that “a neutral . . . shall not 
provide legal advice”); Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 96-003, at 2 (1997). 
 84 See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS IN FAMILY DISPUTES 
(1984). 
 85 MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION (2001), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/family/reports/mediation.authcheck dam.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4WSK-DZJR. 
 86 Id. at vi. 
 87 See Engler, supra note 32, at 2016–17. As Russell Engler has argued, a process that offers no 
protection to an unrepresented litigant who unknowingly waives significant rights is indefensible. Id. 
at 2017. 
 88 MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION cmt. 16, at vii. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at ii (“The Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation are the family 
mediation community’s definition of the role of mediation in the dispute resolution system in the 
twenty-first century. They are the latest milestone in a nearly twenty-year-old effort by the family 
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ing to produce guidelines that were “state-of-the-art,”91 reflecting the many 
lessons learned since the promulgation of the previous standards for mediators 
in family disputes in 1984.92 That the reworked standards continue to bar fami-
ly mediators from providing legal advice reflects the tenacity of the prohibition 
and the degree to which it is accepted as a wise one by the family mediation 
community.93 To the extent that leaders in the field acknowledge a role for me-
diators to play in fostering greater understanding on the part of mediation par-
ticipants, this rationale is based on a distinction between information and ad-
vice.94 Mediators, according to the prevailing view, can provide general infor-
mation about the law (i.e., “Colorado requires divorcing parents to submit a 
parenting plan”) but may not advise individuals on how the law applies to their 
situation (i.e., “Your child’s medical needs may warrant a departure from the 
statutory child support amount”). In theory, the distinction allows mediators to 
shed light on a bewildering process for unrepresented litigants without offering 
the individualized guidance the standards forbid. In practice, however, the di-
viding line is difficult to ascertain, yielding persistent confusion about what is 
and what is not permissible. Moreover, as Professor Russell Engler has 
thoughtfully observed, “most assistance needed by unrepresented litigants is 
likely to involve what would fall within an intellectually honest definition of 
legal advice.”95 
 There is some indication that this insight may be making its way into 
an evolving understanding of the mediator’s role. The American Academy of 
Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML), noting that the ABA’s Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct do not address ethical issues relevant only to specific practice 
areas, endeavors to offer this type of guidance to family law practitioners.96 
The family law standards of conduct promulgated by the AAML in 2009 retain 
some aspects of the predominant view. AAML Standard 8.3 states that an at-
torney acting as a mediator in a family dispute should urge each party to obtain 
                                                                                                                           
mediation community to create standards of practice that will increase public confidence in an evolv-
ing profession and provide guidance for its practitioners.”); id. (“The Model Standards are the product 
of an effort by prominent mediation-interested organizations and individuals to create a unified set of 
standards that will replace existing ones. They draw on existing codes of conduct for mediators and 
take into account issues and problems that have been identified in divorce and family mediation prac-
tice.”). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at ii–iii (describing the various ways in which the 1984 standards were in need of revision). 
 93 It may also very well reflect the ways in which the interests of the organized bar, which has 
vigilantly policed the boundaries of legal practice, shape the product of ABA processes. 
 94 See MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION cmt. 16, at vii. 
 95 See Engler, supra note 32, at 2026. 
 96 American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML), BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY: GOALS FOR 
FAMILY LAWYERS, Preliminary Statement (2009), available at http://www.aaml.org/library/publications/
19/bounds-advocacy, archived at http://perma.cc/5XZ-PQC7. 
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independent legal advice.97 Yet, in a notable departure, AAML provides a lim-
ited allowance to attorney mediators to give advice. Standard 8.4 states that an 
attorney acting as a mediator in a marital dispute should only give advice that 
will enable the parties to make reasonably informed decisions.98 Recognizing 
the controversial nature of the issue, the commentary reasons that the guide-
lines that attempt to distinguish between providing permissible information 
and impermissible advice appear largely semantic and unenforceable.99 More-
over, to the extent that such rules prohibit advice that would assist the partici-
pants in making informed decisions, these rules are undesirable from a policy 
standpoint.100 
A similar evolution can be detected in the revisions made to the Model 
Standards of Conduct for Mediators, a joint effort of the American Arbitration 
Association, the Society of Dispute Resolution Professionals, and the Ameri-
can Bar Association Section on Dispute Resolution. The 1995 version states 
that: 
The primary purpose of a mediator is to facilitate the parties’ volun-
tary agreement. This role differs substantially from other profession-
al-client relationships. Mixing the role of a mediator and the role of 
a professional advising a client is problematic and mediators must 
strive to distinguish between the roles. A mediator should therefore 
refrain from providing professional advice.101 
In contrast, the updated version, promulgated in 2005, reads:  
The role of a mediator differs substantially from other professional 
roles. Mixing the role of a mediator and the role of another profes-
sion is problematic and thus, a mediator should distinguish between 
the roles. A mediator may provide information that the mediator is 
qualified by training or experience to provide, only if the mediator 
can do so consistent with these Standards.102  
The new version omits the prohibitory references to providing advice, suggest-
ing obliquely an emerging possibility that the mediator’s role might be ex-
panded to include this valuable service. 
Although this development in the understanding of the mediator’s ability 
to assist unrepresented parties is a positive one, it should not stunt further in-
novation in the delivery of legal services to divorcing spouses. A significant 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Id. standard 8.3. 
 98 Id. standard 8.4. 
 99 Id. standard 8.4, cmt. 101. 
 100 Id. 
 101 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, standard VI cmt. 4 (1995). 
 102 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, standard VI cmt. (A)(5) (2005). 
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gap remains between a mediator who offers only that “advice that will enable 
the parties to make reasonably informed decisions” and a lawyer who can 
serve a divorcing couple in a more comprehensive manner, offering a wider 
spectrum of advice, managing court deadlines and appearances, assisting with 
the drafting of settlement agreements, and so on.103 A divorcing couple can 
benefit from having an attorney-client relationship with someone who is ac-
countable for advancing their interests to the fullest extent allowed by the joint 
representation. Although joint representation requires sensitivity and certainly 
imposes constraints upon the lawyer’s conduct, a lawyer operating in the con-
text of an attorney-client relationship can offer much more than a mediator, 
even under a liberalized understanding of the mediator’s role. 
III. THE EMERGING MIDDLE GROUND OF LIMITED SCOPE REPRESENTATION 
As the previous section demonstrates, the assistance of a mediator is not a 
substitute for the guidance of a lawyer. What limited help a mediator may be 
able to provide does not adequately cover that essential middle ground be-
tween full-fledged advocacy in the adversarial paradigm and self-representa-
tion. Mediation address some of the concerns associated with the adversarial 
handling of family issues, but does not fill the legal advice gap that is faced by 
divorcing couples who want someone with expertise to guide them to a satis-
factory resolution of all divorce-related issues. 
For many scholars and reformers working to enhance access to justice for 
low and middle income Americans, the solution lies in the “unbundling” of 
legal services.104 Also described as “limited scope representation,” “limited 
assistance representation,” or “discrete task representation,” unbundling allows 
clients to choose legal services from an á la carte menu according to their 
goals, preferences, and financial resources. Forrest Mosten, a pioneer in the 
unbundling movement, explains that, “the client is in charge of selecting one or 
several discrete lawyering tasks contained within the full-service package.”105  
                                                                                                                           
 103 See id. standard 8.4. Even where providing legal advice is not prohibited or discouraged, it 
nonetheless may have unintended consequences. See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 
291 N.W.2d 686, 687 (Minn. 1980) (per curium) (concerning a legal malpractice claim). For example, 
the provision of such advice may be enough to trigger the formation of an attorney-client relationship 
and all of its ramifications. See id. For present purposes, I assume that an attorney following the 
AAML guidelines who effectively communicates to mediation participants that she is not acting as an 
attorney can avoid the formation of an attorney-client relationship. 
 104 See, e.g., Molly M. Jennings & D. James Greiner, The Evolution of Unbundling in Litigation 
Matters: Three Case Studies and a Literature Review, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 825, 831–32 (2012) (de-
scribing the benefits of unbundled legal services). 
 105 FORREST S. MOSTEN, UNBUNDLING LEGAL SERVICES: A GUIDE TO DELIVERING LEGAL SER-
VICES A LA CARTE 1–2 (2000). Mosten describes the full package of legal services as “(1) gathering 
facts, (2) advising the client, (3) discovering facts of opposing party, (4) researching the law, (5) draft-
ing correspondence and documents, (6) negotiating, and (7) representing the client in court.” Forrest 
S. Mosten, Unbundling of Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28 FAM. L.Q. 421, 422–23 (1994). 
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The Model Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the ABA ex-
plicitly authorize this arrangement. Rule 1.2(c) was amended in 2002 to allow 
a lawyer to “limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable 
under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.”106 Forty-one 
states have adopted this provision or something substantially similar.107 In Feb-
ruary 2013, the ABA House of Delegates approved a resolution encouraging 
practitioners to consider providing unbundled legal services.108 Additionally, 
the ABA’s Handbook on Limited Scope Legal Assistance describes thirteen 
different types of limited scope representation that attorneys may offer to their 
clients.109 Lawyers have begun to capitalize on this emerging market by offer-
ing prospective clients detailed explanations of the variety of service models 
they might consider.110 As one unbundling expert enthuses, “[t]his concept—
that attorneys and clients can agree that the attorney will handle only a part of 
the case, such as preparing the papers, or the actual court appearance on one 
issue—is spreading rapidly. It is a win-win-win situation. The litigant gets a 
lawyer when he or she really needs it, the lawyer gets business, and the court 
gets the lawyer’s focus in moving the case.”111 
Limited scope representation is an important development in the expand-
ed provision of legal services to Americans who otherwise cannot afford legal 
help. Professor Russell Engler, an access-to-justice expert who has written ex-
tensively on the provision of services to low and middle-income clients, de-
scribes an emerging “legal services spectrum” that “includes self-help services, 
public legal education and information, advice from non-lawyers, and advice 
and brief services by lawyers in various settings.”112 The ABA’s handbook on 
                                                                                                                           
 106 MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2002). 
 107 ABA Policy Implementation Comm., Variations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (Apr. 7, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/
publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3E97-PKK5. 
 108 ABA Standing Comm. on the Delivery of Legal Services, Resolution No. 108 (2013), availa-
ble at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/delivery_legal_services /ls_del_
unbundling_resolution_108.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 109 HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE, A Report of the Modest Means Task 
Force, ABA Litigation Section, at 16–29, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/task
forces/modest/report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PK6N-5LDV. 
 110 See, e.g., Connecticut Legal Coaching, LLC, http://www.ctlegalcoaching.com/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9HPF-RVGM (last visited Aug. 29, 2014); Law Offices of Donald F. Conviser, 
http://www.conviserfamily law.com/styles.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2014) (differentiating between 
traditional retainer-based full service, unbundled services in which the client is considered pro per, 
and limited scope representation); Forrest S. Mosten, Mediator & Collaborative Attorney, http://www.
mostenmediation.com/legal/coaching.html, archived at http://perma.cc/CPZ6-PMXX (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2013) (listing different services that might be performed for the client, including legal re-
search, negotiation, and drafting). 
 111 Richard Zorza, Access to Justice: Economic Crisis Challenges, Impacts, and Responses, NA-
TIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, at 10 (2009). 
 112 Russell Engler, Turner v. Rogers and the Essential Role of the Courts in Delivering Access to 
Justice, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 47 (2012). 
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limited scope assistance uses family law as the paradigmatic example of a field 
that is appropriate for this kind of assistance, suggesting that this form of rep-
resentation is particularly apt for many divorcing spouses.113 
Notably, however, existing models of limited scope representation offer 
only a partial solution to the problems that animate the search for new delivery 
models for family law litigants.114 Because these models all involve hiring two 
different attorneys to assist each spouse on an individualized basis, they do not 
offer an opportunity for couples to recognize the gains that may be had from 
sharing counsel. Collaborative law, a form of limited scope assistance unique 
to family law, demonstrates the shortcomings of existing models of limited 
scope representation. 
A. The Special Example of Collaborative Law 
The collaborative law approach ameliorates many of the concerns that an-
imate the search for an alternative model to deliver legal services in the family 
law context. Although the practice of collaborative law varies significantly,115 
the approaches share an emphasis on resolving divorce-related matters through 
negotiated settlement rather than litigation. Divorcing spouses who share this 
objective each hire their own collaborative law attorneys who agree to serve 
their respective clients only in negotiation. If the parties fail to arrive at an 
agreement, the attorneys will be disqualified from taking the case to trial.116  
The disqualification agreement is what makes collaborative law a species 
of limited scope representation; it is also what provides the parties and their 
lawyers with an incentive to work collaboratively towards settlement when the 
temptation may be otherwise. As Professor Scott Peppet explains, “the ar-
rangement motivates the attorneys to seek settlement because they will not be 
                                                                                                                           
 113 ABA HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE, at 61–62, available at http://apps.
americanbar.org/litigation/taskforces/modest/report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/C7EM-S76B. 
 114 Lerner v. Laufer, 819 A.2d 471, 482–85 (N.J. 2003) (discussing issues in a particular limited 
scope representation). 
 115 See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, The Ethics of Collaborative Law, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 131, 132–41 
(explaining the varieties of collaborative law and their respective ethical ramifications). 
 116 Pauline H. Tessler defines collaborative family law as follows:  
Two clients, each represented by an independent lawyer working within all applicable 
ethical mandates in the jurisdiction, in a limited purpose retention memorialized in a 
contract or participation agreement that provides, inter alia, that the lawyers are hired 
solely to help the parties reach resolution of their differences, and that the lawyers may 
never participate in any adversarial proceedings between the parties. All negotiations 
take place face to face, with the parties present and actively participating according to a 
structured sequence of tasks and agendas. Discovery is voluntary and is made subject to 
good faith commitments of completeness and accuracy. 
Pauline H. Tessler, Collaborative Family Law, the New Lawyer, and Deep Resolution of 
Divorce-Related Conflicts, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 83, 91. 
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able to collect additional fees by taking the case to court. Simultaneously, 
mandatory disqualification makes it costly—although not impossible—for a 
client to litigate because he or she will need to hire a new attorney and get that 
lawyer up to speed on the divorce. Most important, each side knows at the 
start that the other has similarly tied its own hands by making litigation expen-
sive. By hiring two Collaborative Law practitioners, the parties send a power-
ful signal to each other that they truly intend to work together to resolve their 
differences amicably through settlement . . . . The intention is to never use the 
disqualification provisions—by agreeing to mandatory attorney withdrawal, 
the parties credibly commit to settlement so that litigation (and attorney with-
drawal) becomes far less likely.”117 
Divorce in the collaborative law model thus promises to be less adversar-
ial, and the results seem to bear this out.118 Its practitioners are so enthusiastic 
about its transformative potential that they commit significant resources to re-
structuring their practices in the collaborative vein.119 Collaborative divorces, 
however, can be slow and expensive. According to Pauline Tessler, one of the 
nation’s most prominent practitioners and advocates of collaborative law, the 
standard collaborative divorce process includes the client and attorney first 
making contact; early stage communications with the other party or opposing 
counsel; pre-meetings, agenda-setting, and the first four-way meeting with 
both parties and their attorneys; the debriefing of the first four-way meeting 
between each client and respective attorneys; the mid-game, which can involve 
multiple four-way meetings; and the end-game, which usually concludes the 
settlement.120 Divorcing couples must underwrite a significant amount of at-
torney time, presenting many of the same financial concerns that attend tradi-
tional full-fledged representation.121 
Collaborative law helps a particular subset of divorcing spouses: those 
who intend to resolve their divorce through settlement rather than litigation, 
but who want to be represented in those negotiations by a committed advocate 
with individualized obligations in the traditional mold. Few divorcing couples 
can afford this expensive model, however, and collaborative law does not offer 
                                                                                                                           
 117 Peppet, supra note 115, at 133; see also Pauline H. Tessler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 320–21 (2004) (discussing the incentive for collaborative lawyers to 
remain at the negotiation table longer because, given the potential for disqualification, the lawyer as 
well as the client suffers the risk of failure). 
 118 See Peppet, supra note 115, at 120; William H. Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer 
Look at an Emerging Practice, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 397 (2004). 
 119 See Tessler, supra note 116, at 95–97. 
 120 Elizabeth F. Beyer, Comment, A Pragmatic Look at Mediation and Collaborative Law as 
Alternative to Family Law Litigation, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 303, 320 (2008) (discussing PAULINE H. 
TESSLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITI-
GATION 102 (2001)). 
 121 See supra notes 46–73 and accompanying text. 
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something new to couples who believe that they can make their legal fees go 
farther—and potentially recognize other benefits as well—by sharing counsel. 
While the costs of a collaborative law divorce are considerably lower than 
taking a divorce case to trial,122 they are still substantial—out of reach for 
some families and unappealing for others. The question is whether collabora-
tive law offers enough of a reduction in adversarialism and attorney fee ex-
penditures to suffice as the profession’s sole innovation in the provision of le-
gal services to divorcing families. As the number of self-represented divorce 
litigants continues to increase alongside the growth of collaborative law, the 
answer seems to be no.123 
B. A Limited Departure from Partisan Advocacy 
Limited scope representation as it is currently understood—including the 
collaborative law variety—is squarely grounded in the paradigm of partisan 
advocacy.124 At first glance, this may appear paradoxical—after all, collabora-
tive law in particular has been subject to scrutiny and criticism for being insuf-
ficiently protective of individual client interests and for departing too precipi-
tously from the norm of zealous advocacy.125 As one of its most prominent 
practitioners acknowledges, however, collaborative lawyers serve as a commit-
ted advocate on the side of an individual divorcing spouse.126 Collaborative 
lawyers commit to a particular dispute resolution process and exclude litiga-
tion from the scope of their representation, but otherwise function as partisan 
advocates.127 Other forms of limited scope representation share this attribute: 
whatever discrete task the lawyer performs, the lawyer’s loyalty remains with 
one spouse alone. The lawyer’s role is to advance the interests of the individual 
spouse. 
What could possibly be wrong with this method of representation? The 
profession reflexively treats this not only as an unmitigated good, but a nonne-
                                                                                                                           
 122 See Schwab, supra note 118, at 377. 
 123 See supra notes 104–122 and accompanying text. 
 124 See Tessler, supra note 117, at 320 (describing collaborative law as “building vigorous assis-
tance of legal counsel into the heart of the process”). 
 125 See Schwab, supra note 118, at 380–81; John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: 
Ethics and Practice of Lawyer Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1329 (2003) (noting that the disqualification agreement “creates incentives for 
lawyers to pressure their clients to settle inappropriately and leave clients without an effective advo-
cate to promote their interests and protect them from settlement pressure”). 
 126 See Tessler, supra note 117, at 318 (arguing that clients appear to want a “contained, settle-
ment-oriented, creative, private, respectful process without sacrificing the benefits of having a com-
mitted legal advocate at their sides”); Tessler, supra note 116, at 99 (noting that collaborative lawyers 
“remain advocates for their respective clients”). 
 127 Collaborative lawyers might characterize their practice as a special kind of zealous advocacy, 
one that vigorously advances the interests of their clients’ “better selves” or “highest intentions.” See 
Tessler, supra note 116, at 73. 
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gotiable minimum of ethical representation, and the assumption has not been 
subject to much, if any, challenge in the academic literature.128 This assump-
tion, however, is imported from other areas of law, where the expectation that 
two parties to a dispute will have conflicting interests is more viable.129  
The validity of the assumption in the family law context should be exam-
ined. It rests on empirical questions about the extent to which divorcing cou-
ples see themselves as having interests that harmonize more than they con-
flict.130 If divorcing couples’ inquiries to the practicing bar are any indication, 
significant numbers of prospective domestic relations clients take this view.131  
As the following section explains, hiring two different attorneys to assist 
each spouse on an individual basis provides more legal assistance than some 
divorcing clients want, and of a different tenor.132 These couples seek a partic-
ular form of limited scope representation—one in which a single lawyer pro-
vides them with guidance as to the set of interests they share; assists them in 
arriving at a negotiated resolution of all divorce-related issues; and provides 
them with the drafting expertise necessary to make their agreement clear, con-
crete, and comprehensive.133 
IV. JOINT REPRESENTATION 
This Part introduces the joint representation alternative and demonstrates 
the present demand for such a model. Next, this Part undertakes a close exami-
nation of the ethical rules that govern such arrangements. Finally, this Part 
concludes that the categorical prohibition of joint representation for divorcing 
spouses fails to accord them the same respect that other prospective clients 
receive when seeking the benefits of shared counsel.  
A. The Demand for Joint Representation 
Perhaps the most essential thing to understand about joint representation 
is that many divorcing couples want it. Joint representation appeals to couples 
in relatively amicable divorces because it substantially reduces the costs of 
representation and may reduce the animosity that can develop in adversarial 
settings.134 Family law practitioners are often asked whether they can represent 
both spouses in a divorce matter,135 and routinely address this on the “Fre-
                                                                                                                           
 128 See supra notes 46–73 and accompanying text. 
 129 See Aviel, supra note 52, at 2115–17. 
 130 See supra notes 46–73 and accompanying text.  
 131 See infra notes 134–150 and accompanying text.  
 132 See infra notes 134–150 and accompanying text. 
 133 See infra notes 134–150 and accompanying text. 
 134 FINES, supra note 10, at 94. 
 135 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, DIVORCE MAGAZINE, http://www.divorcemag.com/ 
TX/faq/#legal, archived at http://perma.cc/4WNH-NNL3 (last visited Aug. 30, 2014). 
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quently Asked Questions” portion of their websites.136 Almost invariably, the 
family law practitioners’ websites treat divorcing spouses as having categori-
cally unwaivable conflicts of interest that preclude joint representation under 
any circumstances.137 
 The fact that many lawyers refuse to participate in a transparent joint 
representation does not mean that the clients who seek it end up with two dif-
ferent lawyers, each representing a single spouse’s individual interests.138 Ra-
ther, divorcing couples seeking joint representation to save money and time 
and avoid conflict are being encouraged to consider an arrangement in which 
one of them is represented and the other is not. The website of a Chicago fami-
ly law firm asserts that having one lawyer represent both parties is “a very bad 
idea,” but posits that one lawyer is “more than enough” for an uncontested di-
vorce.139 An online guide to obtaining a divorce in Oklahoma, addressing 
whether one attorney can represent both spouses, observes that “[m]ost attor-
                                                                                                                           
 136 See id. Practitioners invariably respond that they cannot represent both spouses. See, e.g., 
Divorce FAQ, BOLGEN & BOLGEN, http://www.bolgenlaw.com/divorce_faq.htm#where, archived at 
http://perma.cc/NRF6-PS43 (last visited Aug. 30, 2014) (“Because of the conflict of interest between 
divorcing spouses (even those that maintain a cordial relationship), a lawyer cannot represent both 
parties. If you are asking this question, you may want to consider Divorce Mediation. If you and your 
spouse have already reached agreement on all aspects of your divorce, we recommend that one party 
retain an attorney to draft the separation agreement and other documents, and that the other spouse at 
his or her option can retain an attorney simply to review the agreement.”); FAQ, GOODWIN & 
PRUETTE, http://www.mjgoodwin.com/faq/, archived at http://perma.cc/66BM-UAUR (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2014) (“A lawyer cannot represent both spouses and are prohibited from advising a couple 
about their legal rights. An attorney has a duty of loyalty to her clients. Therefore, an attorney cannot 
give legal advice to two people with differing interests. You and your soon to be ex-spouse have dif-
fering interests, no matter how amicable the divorce is.”); Charles Jamieson, Legal Rights: Using the 
Same Lawyer, DIVORCE 360, http://www.divorce360.com/divorce-articles/law/advice/legal-rights-
using-the-same-lawyer.aspx?artid=957, archived at http://perma.cc/X43C-6HY6 (last visited Aug. 30, 
2013); Uncontested Divorce FAQs, KESSLER & SOLOMIANY, http://www.ksfamilylaw.com/FAQS/
uncontested_divorce/, archived at http://perma.cc/S34J-4SCV (last visited Aug. 30, 2014); SOFT DI-
VORCE.COM, http://softdivorce.com/frequently-asked-questions/#16 (last visited Aug. 30, 2014); 
Frequently Asked Questions, MILTON FAMILY LAW, http://www.womensdivorcerights.com/faqs.php, 
archived at http://perma.cc/U9GC-J5UA (last visited Aug. 30, 2014) (Wisconsin divorce laws strictly 
prohibit one lawyer to represent both parties); Frequently Asked Questions, NIRENSTEIN GARNICE 
PLLC, http://ngslaw.com/lawyer/Scottsdale-Phoenix-AZ_fq1094.htm#Jump5797, archived at http://
perma.cc/GXN5-6G8T (last visited Aug. 30, 2014); Frequently Asked Questions, THE LAW OFFICE OF 
ANN M. POMPELIO, LLC, http://www.pompeliolaw.com/faq.html, archived at http://perma.cc/JN2D-
WRAJ (last visited Aug. 30, 2014) (stating that in New Jersey, “One lawyer cannot represent both the 
husband and the wife in divorce litigation”); Texas Divorce Law FAQ’s, THE WRIGHT FIRM FAMILY 
LAW, http://www.denton-familylaw.com/divorce.html#2, archived at http://perma.cc/8HVR-YVW3 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2014). 
 137 See, e.g., NIRENSTEIN GARNICE PLLC, supra note 136 (asserting that “[d]ivorcing spouses 
should never, ever be represented by the same lawyer under any circumstances”). 
 138 See Patrick L. Baude, One Lawyer for the Family: A Response to Alysa Rollock, 73 IND. L.J. 
601, 603–04 (1998) (discussing the undesirable outcomes that attend the refusal to provide counsel to 
a couple or family unit). 
 139 Wolkowitz, supra note 38. 
2014] Counsel for the Divorce 1123 
neys will represent only one party in a divorce to avoid possible conflicts of 
interest.”140 Immediately following that, the website suggests that “[a]n attor-
ney can draft the decree of divorce according to the agreement that you and 
your spouse have made, and allow your spouse to review the decree of divorce 
and approve it, prior to presenting it to the court for approval.”141 
Another family law practitioner, prominent in the unbundled legal ser-
vices movement, provides a detailed explanation on his website regarding the 
various options available to divorcing spouses.142 He contrasts “uncontested 
divorce” from “pro se divorce,” describing uncontested divorces as similarly 
“simple and inexpensive” but involving the assistance of a lawyer.143 He ex-
plains: 
The first thing you need to know about uncontested divorce is that 
the lawyer you get to do your uncontested divorce cannot represent 
both of you. As a society, we assume that the spouses in a divorce 
have necessarily different interests. The ethical principles for law-
yers therefore require that a lawyer cannot represent both parties. 
The lawyer must represent one of you and not the other. The lawyer 
will need to know at the outset which of you is his or her client and 
which of you is not.144  
 With some candor, the attorney acknowledges that this inequity repre-
sents one of the disadvantages of the model of uncontested divorce he propos-
es. The lawyer explains:  
Like it or not, the law sees divorce as an adversarial contest between 
you and your spouse. And because a lawyer must not represent two 
parties who are competing with each other, the lawyer cannot repre-
sent both of you. He or she must represent either you or your 
spouse. In an uncontested divorce, that means the other party will 
not have a lawyer at all. That’s an imbalance of power between the 
spouses.145 
 These offerings seem to be translating into real-life arrangements with 
some regularity. One judge, with over thirty years on the bench and a great 
deal of experience handling family law matters, posited that joint representa-
                                                                                                                           
 140 Divorce in Oklahoma: FAQs, DIVORCENET, supra note 38. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Borden, supra note 38. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
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tion in effect happens “all the time.”146 To avoid the appearance of conflict, 
lawyers asked to represent a divorcing couple will formally represent just one 
of the spouses, but will in fact assist the couple jointly in arriving at an agree-
ment and in drawing up a settlement that reflects the agreed-upon terms of 
both spouses.147 
 What should we make of this phenomenon? In my view, it changes the 
tenor of discussions about joint representation, confronting us with the need to 
take a hard look at the costs of refusing to consider it for couples whose cir-
cumstances make it appropriate. Demand for this service model is so strong 
that the bar’s unwillingness to provide it in a transparent fashion is producing a 
dubious substitute. Although the arrangements described above might appear 
superficially compliant with the ethical rules, they are the worst of all worlds 
in advancing the values the rules purportedly protect. No rule prohibits a law-
yer from representing a client in a matter where the other party is unrepresent-
ed, but it is hardly the model of justice to which the profession should aspire. It 
is inequitable, and renders hollow the legal profession’s commitment to the 
norm of individualized partisan advocacy, exposing some of the fictions upon 
which the norm relies.148 
Yet the obvious inequity of proceeding pro se against a represented oppo-
nent does not fully capture the troubling nature of these arrangements. Where 
one party has a lawyer and the other does not, that fact should be manifestly 
clear so the unrepresented party can evaluate proposals and drafts with appro-
priate skepticism, understanding that they were prepared by an individual par-
tisan advocate with loyalty only to the represented spouse.149 These arrange-
ments present a murky amalgamation of traditional partisan loyalty—owed to 
only one of the divorcing spouses—and quasi-joint representation, in which 
both spouses can expect to benefit from the lawyer’s assistance.150 The unrep-
resented spouse’s perception that the lawyer’s assistance might benefit him or 
her exacerbates the inequity of such lopsided representation. 
This kind of imbalance appears to be a costly consequence of resisting 
joint representation. A fair assessment of the risks and shortcomings of joint 
                                                                                                                           
 146 Interview with State Court Judge (Nov. 7, 2012) (notes and contact information on file with 
author). Because of the sensitivity of the subject matter the judge interviewed requested anonymity. 
The interviewee does not endorse my analysis or conclusions, nor is the interviewee responsible for 
any errors I may have made. 
 147 Id.  
 148 See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble (stating that “when an 
opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the 
same time assume that justice is being done”). 
 149 The lawyer would, of course, be bound by Model Rule 4.3, but these requirements are fairly 
minor. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2012) (stating that lawyers cannot “state or 
imply that the lawyer is disinterested” when dealing with unrepresented parties). 
 150 See infra notes 107–136. 
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representation should take into account the troubling nature of the arrange-
ments that fill the gap. Nonetheless, in the section that follows I consider joint 
representation on its own terms and examine whether it can satisfy the rules of 
professional responsibility. 
B. The Ethics of Joint Representation 
Loyalty to the client is one of the core professional norms lawyers must 
honor.151 The Model Rules express this principle in multiple ways, but most 
pertinently in Rule 1.7, which prohibits representations that will present a con-
current conflict of interest. Analyzing a conflict of interest under this rule in-
volves two stages. First, a lawyer must assess whether the two clients are di-
rectly adverse to each other or whether the representation of one will be mate-
rially limited by the lawyer’s obligations to the other.152 Even if the answer is 
yes to either of these two questions, the lawyer may still proceed if the lawyer 
reasonably believes that he or she can provide competent and diligent repre-
sentation to both clients; the representation is neither prohibited by law nor 
involves one client’s assertion of claims against the other in the same proceed-
ing or tribunal; and both clients give informed consent.153 
The assumption that divorcing spouses have irretrievably conflicting in-
terests that categorically prohibit joint representation would seem to rest on the 
premise that they are “directly adverse” to one another under 1.7(a)(1) and 
asserting claims against each other in the same proceeding under 1.7(b)(3).154 
Divorcing spouses, however, are not always adverse to one another, nor do 
they always assert claims against one another.155  
Every state now offers no-fault divorces, meaning that any couple who 
shares the view that the marriage should end can pursue a divorce without 
proving that one spouse was at fault for the dissolution of the marriage.156 In a 
number of states, a married couple may file jointly to petition for the dissolu-
                                                                                                                           
 151 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt 1 (2012) (“Loyalty and independent 
judgment are essential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client.”). 
 152 See id. R. 1.7(a) (specifying that a concurrent conflict of interest exists where “(1) the repre-
sentation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that 
the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to 
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer”). 
 153 Id. R. 1.7(b)(1)–(4). 
 154 Id. R. 1.7(a)(1), (b)(3). 
 155 See supra notes 134–150 and accompanying text.  
 156 Some states offer both traditional fault-based divorce and no-fault divorce, but make the latter 
procedure available only where both spouses agree the marriage should end. In such states, someone 
who wanted a divorce over the other spouse’s objection would have to prove that one of the fault 
grounds existed. See Jane Biondi, Who Pays for Guilt?: Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform Pro-
posals, Cultural Stereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 611, 615 (1999) (noting 
that fault grounds continue to exist as an alternative divorce procedure in most states). 
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tion of the marriage.157 In divorces initiated by a joint petition for dissolution, 
the spouses do not assert claims against one another and cannot be said to be 
directly adverse.158  
Moreover, states increasingly offer streamlined procedures to couples 
who agree not only to the dissolution of the marriage, but to the resolution of 
the attendant custodial and financial issues as well. In Colorado, for example, a 
divorcing couple without children who agrees on all financial issues can file a 
separation agreement and an affidavit with the court to obtain a decree without 
even making an appearance.159 California offers a similar avenue to divorcing 
couples with minor children, provided that they are able to arrive at a written 
agreement addressing all custodial and financial issues.160 Examining contem-
porary divorce procedures in detail reveals that two divorcing spouses are not 
                                                                                                                           
 157 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 1A (2013); Forms to Start a Divorce, MINNESOTA JUDI-
CIAL BRANCH, http://www.mncourts.gov/selfhelp/?page=1669, archived at http://perma.cc/H3ED-EX23 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2014); Joint Petition for Divorce, THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE JUDICIAL 
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ILLINOIS LEGAL AID, http://www.illinoislegalaid.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.dsp_content&content
ID=1780#q=9, archived at http://perma.cc/3VPW-AACL (last updated Oct. 2011); Joint Petition for 
Summary Dissolution, SUPERIOR COURTS OF CALIFORNIA, available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/
documents/fl800.pdf, archive at http://perma.cc/V2M9-9YCZ (last updated July 1, 2013). 
 158 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122 cmt. g illus. 8 (2000) 
(recognizing the difference between contested and uncontested divorces for purposes of evaluating a 
lawyer’s ability to advise a divorcing couple); see alsoid. cmt. d. illus. 6 (“Husband and Wife have 
agreed to obtain an unconstested dissolution of their marriage. They have consulted Lawyer to help 
them reach an agreement on disposition of their property. A conflict of interest clearly exists between 
the prospective clients. If reasonable prospects of an agreement exist, Lawyer may accept the joint 
representation with the effective consent of both. However, in the later dissolution proceeding, Law-
yer may only represent one of the parties and Lawyer must withdraw from representing both clients if 
their efforts to reach an agreement fail.”).  
 159 See Instructions to File for a Dissolution of Marriage or Legal Separation If There Are No 
Children of the Marriage or the Children Are Emancipated, available at http://www.courts. 
state.co.us/Forms/renderForm1.cfm?Form=50; Affidavit for Decree Without Appearance of Parties 
(Marriage). Interestingly, for couples with minor children, a decree without appearance is only availa-
ble where each party is represented. Id. Although this requirement ensures that cases involving chil-
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party is represented, it imposes a two-lawyer requirement on couples who agree on all of the custodial 
and financial issues of their divorce, a costly imposition for couples who don’t feel that they need this 
form of representation. See id. 
 160 See Completing Divorce or Separation, Uncontested Case, JUDICIAL BRANCH OF CALIFORNIA, 
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/8411.htm, archive at http://perma.cc/SX9C-49NJ. 
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necessarily “directly adverse” within the meaning of 1.7(a)(1) or asserting 
claims against each other under 1.7(b)(3).161 
Thus, Rule 1.7 does not categorically prohibit joint representation in un-
contested divorces. Rather, a more nuanced inquiry is required: in a limited 
scope representation assisting a particular couple, would the duties owed to 
one spouse materially limit the representation of the other? If so, could the 
lawyer reasonably believe that she could provide competent and diligent repre-
sentation to both? What would she have to explain to the couple to ensure that 
their consent to the representation was informed?  
Answering these questions is no simple endeavor, and there may be many 
couples for which the representation would not ultimately be permissible—
couples, for example, whose dissolution involves significant imbalances in 
economic power or allegations of abuse.162 As I explain in the next section, 
however, the first thing to understand about the conflicts analysis is that it must 
be done within the rubric of a limited scope representation. 
1. Starting from the Limited Scope Representation 
When asking whether the representation of one spouse would be material-
ly limited by the lawyer’s duties to the other, the inquiry begins by identifying 
the set of obligations that the limited scope representation would entail.163 
Though a seemingly simple or inconsequential analytical step, a great deal 
flows from it. Accepting the premise of limited scope representation means 
that we do not treat every lawyer-client relationship as defined by the same full 
set of obligations that characterizes the traditional model; rather, we treat law-
yer-client relationships as customizable, subject only to the bounds of reasona-
bleness.164 We allow lawyer and client to specify the particular terms of their 
                                                                                                                           
 161 Other mechanisms also reduce the adversity dynamic in family law cases, including the grow-
ing affirmative obligation to provide complete financial disclosures to the other spouse, formulaic 
calculations of child support, and increasing emphasis on private settlement. The emphasis on private 
settlement is relevant because it makes divorce counsel less like litigators and more like transactional 
attorneys, working to structure mutually beneficial arrangements. Allowing clients to waive conflicts 
presents more concern where litigation is contemplated because independent counsel can advance the 
goals of adversarial truth-finding and other systemic considerations. See Zacharias, supra note 13, at 
420–21. 
 162 See In re Houston, 127 P.2d 752, 753 (N.M. 1999) (suspending an attorney for representing 
wife in dissolution proceeding and husband in criminal proceeding arising out of domestic abuse and 
child abuse allegations). 
 163 See Zacharias, supra note 13, at 427–28 (“The ‘representation,’ however, includes limitations 
to which the lawyer and client have agreed under Model Rule 1.2. The rule therefore does not pre-
clude representation in which the client agrees to limitations that keep the lawyer from optimizing the 
representation.”). Zacharias referenced earlier versions of Rule 1.7 and 1.2, but the point is still 
trenchant. See id. 
 164 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2012) (specifying that a lawyer may limit the 
scope of representation if the limitation is reasonable and the client gives informed consent). 
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arrangement, and to expressly “exclude specific means that might otherwise be 
used to accomplish the client’s objectives.”165 When we are trying to assess 
whether a lawyer’s representation of two clients presents a conflict of interest 
under 1.7(a)(2), we should be concerned with the particular set of responsibili-
ties the lawyer has actually undertaken for the clients, pursuant to their limited 
scope agreement, rather than the theoretical range of possibilities that full rep-
resentation would entail. 
The first step involves envisioning these parameters. What would a joint 
representation look like? Let us take as an example a couple in which both 
spouses work outside the home in similarly salaried jobs. The couple wants to 
dissolve their marriage without litigation and with the assistance of a lawyer. 
The couple wants someone familiar with the system to shepherd them through 
the deadlines and required documents, but they hope for more substantive as-
sistance as well.  
The couple intends to arrive at a negotiated agreement, and although they 
want the lawyer to memorialize the terms of their agreement in a comprehen-
sive and unambiguous way, they seek assistance that goes well beyond that of 
a scrivener. The couple wants to understand the legal principles that form the 
backdrop for their negotiation. Which of their assets would be considered 
marital property, and which would be treated as separate property? How would 
these assets be valued? How might the couple handle assets of a hybrid charac-
ter, like a house that was owned by one spouse prior to the marriage, but for 
which the couple expended marital funds paying down the mortgage? What 
about a pension comprised in whole or in part of funds earned during the mar-
riage?  
The couple believes that having this knowledge will help them arrive at a 
settlement that is fair—not just in an abstract way, but judged against the legal 
principles that govern divorce. They believe that the lawyer’s expertise will 
help them identify solutions that can hedge against unequal distributions of 
risk or create additional value to be leveraged during the dissolution.166 Per-
haps they have agreed to share custody of their children equally, but would like 
advice on what type of plans work best for families in their circumstances and 
which plans are disfavored.167 They would like to know if they have devised a 
                                                                                                                           
 165 Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 6. 
 166 A minimally competent family law attorney could, for example, enlighten even sophisticated 
clients as to the mechanism of a qualified domestic relations order, which can be used to distribute the 
marital portion of an unvested pension if and when the pension should vest. 
 167 See McMullen & Oswald, supra note 4, at 68. The authors of one empirical study note that the 
contemporary “emphasis on custody mediation and settlement” yields “a multitude of idiosyncratic 
custody outcomes.” Id. They note that, “a preliminary examination of randomly selected divorce files 
from our sample revealed a range of custody solutions so diverse that they could not be categorized. It 
appears that every divorcing family addresses custody in its own way.” Id. Thus, the assistance of a 
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schedule that would be considered too disruptive by the judge who must sign 
off on their custody agreement.168 They seek what scholars have described as a 
“constructive lawyer” whose “legal creativity” and capacities for “problem-
solving” and “peace-making” add value for their clients and others as well.169 
What the couple does not want, or is willing to forego in order to recog-
nize what they consider to be the superior benefits of sharing counsel, is for the 
lawyer to identify arguments that one spouse might make to obtain a larger 
share of marital assets170 or parenting time over the objection of the other. 
They want to understand the law of divorce insomuch as it would help them 
facilitate agreement; they do not need the kind of advice that advances the in-
terests of one spouse at the expense of the other. 171 Although the dividing line 
between these categories is not always clear and may not be discernible until 
                                                                                                                           
professional who has observed this vast range of possible solutions benefits couples immensely. See 
id. 
 168 Crafting a sensible joint custody plan involves balancing several competing interests: frequent 
contact with both parents, minimal transitions for children, and distributing preferred weekend days in 
an equitable fashion. As a result, the joint custody plan that is optimal for a particular family might be 
more intricate than the uninitiated would expect. For example, a couple sincerely committed to the 
equitable allocation of post-divorce parenting time might contemplate a schedule of alternating weeks. 
Although this plan achieves joint custody with minimal travel for the children, the children go an 
entire week without seeing one parent. To ameliorate this problem while trying to avoid excessive 
transfers, some attorneys will propose a 3-3-4-4 plan, in which the children are with one parent for 
three days, the other for the next three days, then back to the first residence for four days, and then 
with the second parent for four days. The child is always at one residence Sunday through Wednesday 
and the other Thursday through Friday, which provides consistency, and only Saturday fluctuates 
from week to week.  
 169 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 792. Menkel-Meadow envisions a world in which:  
Lawyering was informed by a different mind-set, orientation, consciousness, or “frame” 
than maximizing individual client gain. Suppose for the moment that what we thought a 
lawyer should do would be to “solve a problem,” make a bad situation better, improve 
relationships between embittered parties, or facilitate the best possible arrangements in 
complex environments with many (not only two) competing claims. . . . Going a step 
further, some might suggest that a lawyer should aim to maximize joint, mutual, group, 
or collective gain in using her craft—the misnamed “lawyer for the situation.” 
Id. 
 170 Although some statutes provide for the equal distribution of marital property, most instruct 
judges to divide marital property equitably, taking into consideration a variety of factors. The Uniform 
Marriage and Divorce Act, for example, upon which many states model their domestic relations stat-
utes, instructs judges to consider “all relevant factors,” including each party’s contribution to the ac-
quisition of marital property, the value of separate property set apart to each spouse, and the economic 
circumstances of each party at the time the property distribution is to become effective. UNIF. MAR-
RIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 (1973). In contested divorce proceedings, then, parties may contend 
that they are entitled to a larger share of marital assets by pointing to their spouse’s substantial sepa-
rate property or asserting that their spouse contributed comparatively little to the acquisition of the 
marital property. See id. 
 171 They do not wish, for example, to obtain the assistance of a lawyer in identifying ways that 
one spouse might undermine the other’s claims of contribution to the marital estate. 
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the lawyer is perilously close to it, the essential feature of the desired assis-
tance is the deployment of legal expertise to facilitate agreement.172 
Why should this kind of advice be available only in an adversarial pos-
ture? Why should each spouse have to pay for and obtain such guidance indi-
vidually, from a lawyer whose role is to point out where the client might press 
for additional advantage? Is it not possible to envision this kind of help unbun-
dled from partisan advocacy? The answer cannot be that it is impossible to ex-
plain legal principles in a neutral fashion, because clients expect this kind of 
advice all the time. The very concept of client counseling presupposes the idea 
that whatever debates we might entertain about the manipulability of law or 
the appropriate contours of a lawyer’s advice,173 legal rules, as applied by ac-
tors in the real world, have some ascertainable content independent of the cli-
ents’ objectives that the client wants to understand. 
Accepting this line of thinking does not require that we ignore the realist 
critique of law. The law’s indeterminacy shapes but hardly eliminates the cli-
ent’s desire to understand the law as it appears from a viewpoint other than 
hers. Where the law is indeterminate enough to produce more than one plausi-
ble result, clients want to know the range of realistic possibilities. Where the 
legal rule in question is so radically indeterminate as to frustrate such endeav-
ors,174 a lawyer can convey that insight, which itself advances the client’s un-
derstanding. In other words, a lawyer can describe the law and predict its ap-
plication to a particular fact pattern without adopting the perspective of an in-
dividual client. Moreover, this provides an enormously useful service even for 
a client who obtains no additional guidance on how she might optimize her 
own self-interest within the legal parameters identified by the lawyer. In full-
fledged representation, we expect that the lawyer’s objective analysis of the 
law will be followed by partisan advice to the client about how the client can 
most effectively pursue her objectives given the legal landscape as sketched 
out by the lawyer. But it is perfectly plausible to envision a limited scope rep-
resentation in which only the first type of advice is offered—objective analysis 
without the valence of advocacy.175 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See ABA MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE 
32 (2003) available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/taskforces/modest/report.pdf, http://
perma.cc/SX9C-49NJ (discussing an Oregon lawyer’s “non-adversarial divorce service,” in which she 
handles only uncontested divorces and provides legal counseling and legal assistance, but does not 
otherwise represent the client). 
 173 Steve Pepper et al., The Internal Point of View in Law and Ethics: Introduction, 75 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1143, 1146–48 (2006). 
 174 The Best Interests of the Child standard is one such candidate, as I have explored in earlier 
work. Aviel, supra note 51, at 2014–18.  
 175 The Model Rules once explicitly envisioned this kind of representation. See Ethics 2000 
Commission, Report on the Model Rules, ABA, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2k_report_home.html, archive at http://
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In this vein the lawyer might instruct the couple that, “[i]n this jurisdic-
tion, all assets acquired by each of you before the marriage are treated as sepa-
rate property, as are gifts or inheritances.” The lawyer can explain that labor 
performed during the marriage is considered marital labor, and its fruits are 
considered marital property, regardless of the name on the paycheck or the ac-
count into which such funds are deposited.176 The lawyer could examine the 
circumstances surrounding the acquisition of all the couple’s assets and offer 
an objective view as to their likely value and whether they were separate or 
marital assets, allowing the couple a legally informed perspective from which 
to arrive at a mutually agreeable distribution of property.  
The lawyer can propose various allocations of marital property, allowing 
the couple an opportunity to weigh the strengths and weaknesses of each alter-
native—advising the couple, for example, as to whether market conditions 
counsel against selling the marital home in spite of the fact that the sale would 
bring needed liquidity and facilitate an equal and administratively simple divi-
sion of assets. For couples amenable to delaying the sale to maximize their 
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/6VSK-HMPU. Rule 2.2, titled “Lawyer as Intermediary,” previously set forth the terms for 
joint representation: 
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if (1) the lawyer consults with 
each client concerning the implications of the common representation, including the 
advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-client privileges, and ob-
tains each client’s consent to the common representation; (2) the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves that the matter can be resolved on terms compatible with the clients’ best inter-
ests, that each client will be able to make adequately informed decisions in the matter 
and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if 
the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and (3) the lawyer reasonably believes that 
the common representation can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect 
on other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients. 
 
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning 
the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant to making them, so that each 
client can make adequately informed decisions. 
 
(c) The lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if any 
of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the 
lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the sub-
ject of the intermediation. 
See id. at 73. Rule 2.2 was eliminated by the 2002 amendments to the Model Rules, after the Ethics 
2000 Commission found that situations governed by Rule 2.2 could be dealt with adequately under 
Rule 1.7 and that the existence of the two rules was confusing rather than helpful. See Reporter’s 
Explanation of Changes, AM. BAR ASSOC., available at http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2k_report_home.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/745Y-H9P3. 
 176 See American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 669, § 4.05 
cmt. (a) (2002) (“A fundamental principle of community-property law followed today in most com-
mon-law jurisdictions is that the fruits of labor performed during marriage by either spouse, i.e. mari-
tal labor, belong to the marital community, and are not the separate property of the laboring spouse.”). 
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return, the lawyer might offer suggestions for drawing up a financial plan that 
will cover the period before the house can be profitably sold. Without improp-
erly favoring one spouse over the other, a lawyer can offer significant assis-
tance in the distribution of the couple’s assets, one of the core tasks of the dis-
solution process.177 
How might a lawyer engaged in a joint representation manage the issue of 
alimony? It is one thing to assist a couple in identifying their separate property 
and divvying up marital assets, but spousal maintenance seems to present the 
sort of challenging grey area referenced above. The suggestion that one spouse 
might be entitled to ongoing payments from the other spouse for a period after 
the divorce is what many would consider the kind of advice that advances the 
interests of one spouse at the expense of the other.178  
This conclusion, natural as it may seem, bears scrutiny. First, the financial 
issues in a divorce are intertwined—property distribution and spousal support 
must be negotiated and resolved holistically because parties might accept 
trade-offs across these issues as a way to obtain a mutually agreeable compre-
hensive settlement. Moreover, to insist that a lawyer providing joint represen-
tation for a divorcing couple cannot provide any guidance about alimony in-
dulges in the conceptual error of assuming “cardboard clients”—individuals 
who are “one dimensional figures interested only in maximizing their legal and 
financial interests.”179 In fact, as Professor Katherine Kruse has explained so 
persuasively, clients are “whole persons whose legal issues often come deeply 
intertwined with other concerns—relationships, loyalties, hopes, uncertainties, 
fears, doubts, and values—that shape the objectives they bring to legal repre-
sentation.”180  
There are a multitude of reasons that spouses might share a common view 
as to why maintenance might be appropriate or inappropriate for their circum-
stances. Perhaps the higher-earning spouse, the likely obligor, views legal rules 
as “guides to the conduct of social life,” and values the law as a source of ob-
jective authority about what is fair, an expression of the way in which friends, 
colleagues, and loved ones might judge the outcome.181 Perhaps the lower-
earning spouse values a sense of finality and independence above the monetary 
entitlement the law might afford. 
Even indulging the assumption that the higher-earning spouse prefers to 
avoid paying maintenance and the lower-earning spouse prefers to receive it, 
                                                                                                                           
 177 This assistance is much more substantive and involved than what a mediator can offer. See 
supra, notes 81–85. 
 178 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 179 See Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
103, 104 (2010). 
 180 Id.  
 181 H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 90 (2d ed. 1994). 
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one can imagine a situation where the lawyer explains the law of spousal 
maintenance in a way that does not advance the interests of one spouse at the 
expense of another. For example, consider a law that specifies that mainte-
nance should only be awarded if the couple was married at least three years.182 
The lawyer can certainly explain that much to a couple without compromising 
the neutrality of the joint representation. For most couples, determining wheth-
er their marriage was of sufficient duration to bring maintenance into issue will 
be straightforward.183 Couples married less than three years will instantly real-
ize that a judge would not award maintenance, although as masters of their 
own voluntary agreement, they will still need to decide whether to incorporate 
it into their settlement. Couples married longer than three years will see that 
they need additional guidance about the law of spousal maintenance to assess 
whether it is relevant to their situation. In either case, the lawyer’s transmission 
of the three-year minimum is not inextricably infused with advocacy, some-
thing so complex or contested that it has no ascertainable meaning independent 
of the lawyer’s influence. 
If we accept that a lawyer can explain the three-year minimum from a po-
sition of neutrality, or at least something that looks tolerably like it, why can’t 
the lawyer go a bit further, providing a more detailed explanation of the law’s 
terms and pattern of application, without being characterized as advancing the 
interests of one spouse at the expense of the other? If the law provides for a 
higher-earning spouse to make such payments to a lower earning spouse under 
certain conditions, does the lawyer advance the interests of one spouse at the 
expense of another to offer his view regarding the existence of these condi-
tions? If the lawyer had never seen an alimony award where the salary discrep-
ancy between the spouses was less than 15%, or with a duration that exceeded 
ten years, could she not say so? 
Suggesting that the lawyer cannot raise the issue of maintenance and ex-
plain its contours without promoting the interests of one spouse at the expense 
of the other embraces a radical form of the indeterminacy thesis, viewing the 
law “not as a coherent guide to permissible conduct, but as an arsenal of weap-
ons that can be used to justify virtually any position a client wishes to main-
                                                                                                                           
 182 See, e.g., H.B. 13-1058 § 14-10-114 (Colo. 2013) (establishing guidelines for the calculation 
of alimony awards in cases involving marriages of more than three years in duration). 
 183 I acknowledge the work of scholars who have demonstrated that even seemingly straightfor-
ward rules can sometimes present interpretive problems and require substantive value judgments. 
Prominent among these is Gary Peller, who asserts that no straightforward rule can be applied me-
chanically without the influence of social or political ideology. See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of 
American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1175 (1985). For example, the rule that a president must be 
thirty-five years old, he argues, really exists to ensure that the president is mature enough to assume 
the responsibilities of office. See id. at 1174. 
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tain.”184 Such radical indeterminacy has been quite vulnerable to scholarly crit-
icism.185 To whatever extent it reflects the intuitions of most practicing lawyers 
about how to craft arguments when representing a client,186 it need not consti-
                                                                                                                           
 184 See Charles M. Yablon, The Indeterminacy of the Law: Critical Legal Studies and the Prob-
lem of Legal Explanation, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 917, 917–18 (1985). 
 185 See Lawrence Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 462, 488 (1987) (arguing that “the strong version of the [indeterminacy] thesis seems indefensi-
ble”). Solum offers three “firm conclusions” about indeterminacy: 
First, legal doctrine underdetermines the results in many, but not all, actual cases. That 
is to say that aside from the easiest cases, aspects of the outcome are rule-guided but 
not rule-bound. For example, in the most routine cases, the amount of a traffic fine or of 
a damage award may vary within some range. Second, although there may be some 
cases in which the result is radically underdeterminate, in the sense that any party could 
‘win’ under some valid interpretation of legal doctrine, it does not follow that the doc-
trine itself is indeterminate over all cases. For example, the three-pronged test for im-
permissible state establishment of religion, articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, is often 
criticized as highly underdeterminate. But, in spite of any uncertainty about some appli-
cations of the Lemon test, we can be quite sure that a court applying the Lemon test 
would strike down any law giving parochial school teachers a pay raise out of state 
funds. Third, it is pure nonsense to say that legal doctrine is completely indeterminate 
even with respect to very hard cases. Even in the hardest hard case, legal doctrine limits 
the court’s options. One of the parties will receive a judgment, not some unexpected 
stranger; the relief will be related to the dispute at hand and will not be a declaration 
that Mickey Mouse is the President of the United States. 
Id. 
 186 This assertion has been contested, however. See David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 
104 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1990). Wilkins observes that: 
[I]f the most radical version of the indeterminacy thesis were really true for lawyers, 
one would expect to find a world with virtually no certainty or predictability about the 
arguments lawyers make or the advice they give. There would be widespread disagree-
ment about the actual scope of legal boundaries in all but the most routine cases, and 
lawyers would continually wonder about how to structure transactions so as to avoid fu-
ture liability. This is not how most practicing lawyers experience their lives. By all ac-
counts, most lawyers feel quite capable of judging what constitutes a “good” legal ar-
gument. In addition, lawyers depend on the ability to make reasonably accurate predic-
tions about how particular legal disputes will be resolved. These widespread realities 
suggest that there must be some meaningful constraints on the manner in which lawyers 
interpret legal rules. 
Id. Yablon argues that the indeterminacy claim of Critical theorists finds support in the 
practicing bar: 
The very fact that opposing lawyers are invariably able to ask courts or other deci-
sionmakers for directly contradictory results and have no trouble finding potentially ap-
plicable doctrinal rules with which to fill their briefs is strong evidence for the Critical 
claim that doctrinal rules are indeterminate and, therefore, cannot explain value choices. 
Yablon, supra note 185, at 939. But he also acknowledges that: 
Lawyers can, and often do, “determine,” in the sense of “predict,” the results of con-
crete cases, and they do so largely through an analysis and application of doctrinal prin-
ciples. Every time a lawyer advises a client that one course of action entails less legal 
risk than another, or tells one client she has a case while advising another he doesn’t, 
that lawyer is predicting, often with a high degree of success, the probable result of a 
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tute the sole mode in which lawyers advise clients unless one truly cannot im-
agine a useful statement of legal principles that is not colored by a particular 
client’s interests and objectives. We know this is not true, in the same way we 
know, as Professor Larry Solum reminds us, that walking one’s dog does not 
violate the antitrust laws.187 Just as a law professor or a CLE instructor or a 
clerk talking to her judge could set forth the language of the statute and distill 
the fact patterns of decided cases to develop some map of the sure cases on 
either end of the spectrum and the mass of close cases in the middle, so too 
could a lawyer engage in this type of discussion with clients.  
I do not suggest that those doctrinal principles that can be identified and 
discussed from an objective stance are so determinate or complete as to enable 
confident and neutral predictions about the likely outcome of every divorce 
case; rather, I argue simply that knowing the doctrinal principles that can be 
ascertained is worth something. These principles matter. They occupy enough 
of a role in the legal system that people whose lives are affected by the system 
would want to know them. Professor Solum makes the point quite elegantly by 
observing that in all but the easiest cases, “aspects of the outcome are rule-
guided but not rule-bound.”188 It is perfectly rational for amicably divorcing 
spouses to conclude that knowing the rules that guide their divorce is worth 
paying for, even if they do not wish to expend resources on more extensive 
forms of legal assistance. 
Acknowledging what Professor Solum calls “significant zones of under-
determination and contingency in legal doctrine,”189 in no way forecloses the 
type of representation envisioned in this Article. This more modest indetermi-
nacy thesis, which acknowledges the existence of hard cases that cannot be 
resolved simply by mechanical application of doctrinal principles, merely lim-
its the scope of the advice the lawyer can give, making the predictions vaguer, 
the signposts farther apart.190 The lawyer can say, “All we know about alimony 
is this. Everything else is up for grabs, and I cannot help one of you grab it at 
the expense of the other.” The lawyer must monitor the point at which neutral 
explication of relatively clear legal principles transforms into argumentative 
strategies that can deploy indeterminacy for one client’s end or the other.191 
                                                                                                                           
concrete case. Indeed, much of what lawyers sell is their ability to predict the responses 
of legal institutions based (at least in part) on their ability to analyze doctrinal materi-
als.”  
Id. at 918. 
 187 See Solum, supra note 185, at 484 (noting that lawyers have a data set that demonstrates their 
ability to predict legal decisions). 
 188 Id. 
 189 See id. at 503. 
 190 See supra notes 182–187 and accompanying text. 
 191 See id. 
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This model requires the couple to tolerate certain lacunae in the lawyer’s 
discussion of the law; in discussing principles of marital property, for example, 
the lawyer could not identify ways in which one spouse might undermine the 
other spouse’s claims of contribution to the marital estate. In a limited scope 
representation, that is perfectly acceptable. It is considerably more troubling to 
imagine a couple arriving at a binding agreement without having such issues 
raised and explained, as happens all too frequently in mediation with pro se 
parties.192 Jointly represented couples benefit from the guidance of a lawyer 
who understands and explains the rules, even if they do not wish to pay for the 
assistance of someone who can exploit the ambiguity and indeterminacy of the 
rules in their individual favor. 
The couple we are concerned with is highly motivated to resolve all pend-
ing issues in the divorce quickly, smoothly, and inexpensively, without engag-
ing in litigation. Prioritizing these legitimate, even laudable goals means fore-
going certain aspects of the lawyer’s toolkit, but there is certainly plenty left to 
be useful. In this context, the lawyer’s guidance regarding alimony brings the 
issue to the couple’s attention; educates the couple about the law’s contours, 
such as they can be ascertained in a legal system probably best described as 
weakly indeterminate; and helps them assess whether it is realistic to arrive at 
agreement on this issue.  
The lawyer also can use her understanding of spousal maintenance as part 
of an overarching problem-solving strategy. If the lawyer sees that one spouse 
places a relatively high priority on having liquid assets in the short term, the 
lawyer could suggest spousal maintenance payments as an alternative to a 50-
50 split of marital property, which leverages the divergent interests between 
the spouses for mutual gain.193 And even if one is not persuaded that a single 
lawyer can ethically provide a divorcing couple with any guidance on alimony, 
this would still leave open the possibility of joint representation for couples 
who have made decisions about alimony prior to consulting with a lawyer and 
who do not seek counsel in that particular area. 
To suggest that a lawyer cannot add value for the couple without improp-
erly favoring one or the other represents a hidebound, even impoverished view 
of the lawyer’s role, not only elevating individualized partisan advocacy above 
all other forms of legal assistance, but making it inextricable from the other 
functions a lawyer can perform.194 Especially given the financial imperatives 
                                                                                                                           
 192 See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
 193 As used here, “divergent interests” refers to the notion that two parties to a negotiation can 
benefit when they want different things. See generally ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY, & BRUCE PAT-
TON GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (3d ed. 2011). 
 194 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Crea-
tivity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 785 (1999) (describing the tradi-
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that drive couples to seek joint representation, it does not benefit clients to in-
sist that two lawyers duplicate these functions so that each client receives indi-
vidualized partisan advocacy. This imposition runs contrary to the insights that 
inspire the movement towards unbundled legal services and resists the now 
decades-old call for the profession to recognize the lawyer’s core competencies 
as problem solver and process manager.195 
For a divorcing couple, then, one can envision a limited scope representa-
tion in which the lawyer advises and assists spouses in arriving at a negotiated 
agreement of all pending issues in the divorce. The representation is limited to 
the couple’s joint interests in learning how the law applies to their situation and 
obtaining the benefit of the lawyer’s expertise and experience, for the purpose 
of arriving at an agreement. This limitation is reasonable under the circum-
stances, and thus one permitted by Rule 1.2(c) where the clients give informed 
consent. 
The clients’ informed consent is, of course, essential to the arrangement, 
and the lawyer’s obligation to explain the limitations of this form of represen-
tation is substantial. As with many other aspects of the attorney-client relation-
ship,196 the client’s ability to authorize this course of action depends on the 
attorney’s adequate explanation of its risks and alternatives. Although the de-
tails of each couple’s circumstances will shape the contours of the discussion, a 
lawyer must take several essential steps to obtain a truly robust, informed con-
sent. 
First, the lawyer must work with the couple to identify a clear, shared in-
tention for amicable settlement of all divorce-related issues; determine whether 
and to what extent the couple has already arrived at agreement; and ascertain 
what legal assistance the couple seeks. The lawyer should clarify whether the 
couple seeks assistance beyond that of a scrivener, and if so, should warn the 
couple that the lawyer’s guidance about the prevailing legal principles may 
undermine previously agreed upon terms. Imagine, for example, a couple who 
has agreed that one spouse will receive alimony well below the jurisdiction’s 
presumptive guidelines. As explored above, a lawyer can inform the couple of 
that fact without engaging in impermissible partisan advocacy, but it nonethe-
less might destabilize the couple’s tentative agreement and expose rifts that 
could bring the joint representation to an end. 
                                                                                                                           
tional conception of the role of lawyer as an advocate of his client and as someone else’s adversary as 
“crabbed and incomplete”). 
 195 See id. 
 196 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5–1.9 (emphasizing a lawyer’s responsibility to 
adequately explain the details of a representation to the client with regard to contingent fee agree-
ments, waivers of confidentiality, conflicts of interest, business transactions, and aggregate settle-
ments). 
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Second, the attorney must set forth the limits of confidentiality in a joint 
representation. The lawyer must explain that information disclosed by one 
spouse must be shared with the other whenever it is relevant to the representa-
tion.197 The couple must also understand that the attorney-client privilege only 
protects the couple’s communications with their attorney against compelled 
disclosure by third parties. Thus, if a dispute later emerges between the divorc-
ing spouses, neither can invoke the privilege against the other.198 Because the 
sharing of relevant information is essential to a workable joint representation, 
the lawyer may want to meet with each spouse individually to ensure that there 
are no potential secrets that would derail the representation. 
Finally, the lawyer must explain the various contingencies that might re-
quire her to withdraw from the representation.199 If issues emerge upon which 
the couple cannot agree, or if one spouse asks the lawyer to keep confidential 
information that is relevant to the divorce, the lawyer will have to withdraw. To 
obtain further assistance, the spouses will then need to engage two more law-
yers, driving up the expense and making the attempt at joint representation a 
costly one. In sum, the lawyer must emphasize the uncertainty inherent in a 
joint representation, and ensure that each member of the couple knowingly and 
voluntarily chooses to proceed in that fashion. 
2. Conducting the Conflicts Analysis 
Once we understand how much analytical work is being done by the lim-
ited scope of the representation, the conflicts assessment takes on a different 
tenor. If we treat the limited scope agreement as pre-existing, it is not clear that 
the lawyer’s representation of one spouse would be “materially limited” by her 
duties to the other spouse beyond what is inherent in the limited scope agree-
ment. I understand why this seems objectionable—this reading seems to de-
prive Rule 1.7 of its independent force, treating Rule 1.2(c) as a bypass around 
the strictures of Rule 1.7, or perhaps transferring the conflicts analysis to a rule 
less suited for it. Rule 1.7, however, contemplates this inter-relationship with 
Rule 1.2. Comment 32 instructs that “[w]hen seeking to establish or adjust a 
relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer’s 
role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances, and 
thus, that the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for deci-
                                                                                                                           
 197 See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 31 (providing that “[t]he lawyer should, at the outset of the common repre-
sentation and as part of the process of obtaining each client’s informed consent, advise each client that 
information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some 
matter material to the representation should be kept from the other”). 
 198 See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 30 (stating that the attorney-client privilege does not attach between com-
monly represented clients and that lawyers must advise their clients that if litigation emerges, none of 
their communications with the lawyer will be protected). 
 199 See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 31. 
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sions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the 
scope of the representation made necessary as a result of the common repre-
sentation should be fully explained to the clients at the outset of the representa-
tion.”200 The comment then cross-references Rule 1.2(c), demonstrating that 
the conflicts analysis is shaped by the limited scope representation and vice 
versa. 
For the sake of being analytically thorough, however, let us read 1.7(a)(2) 
as referencing some irreducible minimum of lawyer obligation that exists in 
spite of a limited scope agreement, so as to trigger the lawyer’s obligation to 
satisfy 1.7(b). Put differently, let us imagine that a joint representation, while 
compliant with 1.2(c)’s requirements for a limited scope representation, none-
theless does present a “significant risk that the representation of one or more 
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another 
client,” thereby triggering a conflicts analysis under 1.7(b). A joint representa-
tion of divorcing spouses can satisfy 1.7(b), as well it should. Rule 1.7(b) sets 
forth sensible requirements that ensure that clients in a joint representation un-
derstand what they are giving up and receive a competent performance for 
those aspects of the representation that are within the agreed-upon scope .201  
There is no reason not to allow attorneys to undertake this analysis for a 
divorcing couple who seeks joint representation. Although joint representations 
may not necessarily satisfy 1.7(b) in any categorical way, there will be couples 
who could receive competent, diligent representation consistent with the terms 
of the contemplated limited scope agreement, and who would consent to the 
arrangement after being thoroughly apprised of its potential shortcomings.202 
In envisioning what a limited scope representation might look like for a 
divorcing couple, we sketched out how an attorney could provide competent, 
diligent representation to both spouses even while forgoing individualized par-
tisan advocacy on behalf of either. Not all couples fit this profile, however. 
Some couples arrive at the point of dissolution with interests that actually con-
flict in a concrete and tangible way, and where one or both spouses have indi-
vidual needs that are stronger and more compelling than their joint interest in 
reducing the cost and hostility of the divorce process.  
The starkest example is where one spouse has been the victim of abuse at 
the hands of the other, which renders impossible the reasoned, cooperative ne-
gotiation, premised upon knowledge of legal principles and creative problem-
solving, upon which joint representation is predicated. Nor are there gains to 
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 202 See Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 902 (Ct. App. 1977) (directing the trial 
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be recognized by achieving the dissolution with a minimum of acrimony. Vic-
tims of domestic violence need a committed, even aggressive advocate, loyal 
only to their interests, who can obtain restraining orders against their batterers, 
argue for sole physical and legal custody of their children, and obtain property 
and maintenance awards heavily weighted towards their clients’ interests in 
recovering from the abuse and achieving financial independence.  
The critique of mediation as dangerous and unjust for victims of domestic 
violence203 applies with even greater force to joint representation. A limited 
scope representation would be unreasonable under Rule 1.2(c) in this situation. 
Nor could competent and diligent representation be provided to both spouses, 
making the representation impermissible under Rule 1.7(b)(1). Applying the 
rules simply confirms the common sense inclination that joint representation is 
unethical for couples whose relationship is plagued by abuse. 
Domestic violence is not the only phenomenon that would make a joint 
representation inappropriate. Imagine a couple comprised of individuals with 
markedly different earning capacities at the time of divorce. Perhaps, as is still 
often the case, the couple decided jointly during the marriage that the overall 
welfare of the family would be maximized if one spouse were to put her own 
educational and professional pursuits on hold to manage the household and 
care for the couple’s children.204 Such an arrangement allows the other spouse 
to devote time and energy to professional advancement, resulting in an en-
hanced income stream that benefits the entire family during the marriage.205 
Upon dissolution, however, the economic dependency fostered by this ar-
rangement is solely born by the caregiving spouse, while the other spouse 
walks away from the marriage with professional and financial prospects re-
flecting the family’s investment in his or her career.206 
                                                                                                                           
 203 See generally Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 
YALE L.J. 1545 (1991). 
 204 See, e.g., Lorenz v. Lorenz, 881 N.Y.S.2d 208, 208 (App. Div. 2009). In Lorenz v. Lorenz, the 
husband’s annual income was roughly $100,000, while the wife’s was around $20,000 at the time of 
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 205 The framework of equitable distribution rests on this idea, making it enormously important in 
divorce law. 
 206 There is extensive scholarly literature analyzing this pattern of labor specialization and con-
sidering its implications for rendering justice at divorce. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of 
Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 42–49 (1989); Mary Kay Kisthardt, Re-thinking Alimony: The AAML’s 
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not value that work”); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. 
L. REV. 2227, 2229–30 (1994). 
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The higher earning spouse may freely and readily embrace the idea that 
the financial components of the divorce must address this inequity, and might 
fully participate in the drafting of an agreement that provides the caregiving 
spouse with an appropriate package of marital property and post-divorce sup-
port. If not, however, it would be impossible to provide competent and diligent 
representation to a couple in this posture. A wife whose nonfinancial contribu-
tions to the marriage render her economically vulnerable cannot plausibly 
share an attorney with a husband who views his earning capacity as the result 
of individual effort, and thus his alone to enjoy after the divorce. 
The truth is that we can imagine any number of divorcing couples for 
whom joint representation would be inappropriate and unethical. Whenever 
spouses have incompatible views about how an issue should be resolved, and 
place a higher value on obtaining their preferred resolution of that issue than 
the gains that come from an uncontested divorce, the same attorney cannot 
represent them.207 This represents a straightforward application of Rule 1.7, 
which calls for an examination of the facts of each situation and an assessment 
of the actual needs and interests of the specific clients in question. Rule 1.7, 
which cautions against the risks of joint representation for any type of client,208 
adequately guides the sorting of appropriate candidates for joint representation 
from those who cannot be ethically represented in this way. Indeed, it is the 
assertion that the interests of divorcing spouses cannot be trusted to the ordi-
                                                                                                                           
 207 Although an absence of disputed issues is a necessary condition for joint representation, I do 
not mean to suggest that it is sufficient. Superficial expressions of agreement can mask power imbal-
ances between the parties and cannot necessarily be relied upon as a basis for a lawyer to assist a cou-
ple in drafting an egregiously one-sided settlement. See Blum v. Blum, 477 A.2d 289, 297–298 (Md. 
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the conscience.” Id. at 292. The court reviewing the agreement “found that Mr. Blum was the domi-
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ity in arranging the food and clothing; the relative positions of the parties in the marriage; and Mrs. 
Blum’s concern that he would not let her leave the marriage.” Id. at 295–96. The court also found that 
the husband dictated the terms of the agreement, making the engagement anything but a true joint 
representation. Id. at 293. Although it should be obvious that a lawyer engaged in a permissible and 
authentic joint representation cannot simply take direction from one party at the manifest expense of 
the other, the case also illustrates that superficial expressions of agreement do not provide an adequate 
basis for a joint representation; rather, a lawyer must exercise some independent judgment in review-
ing a proposed settlement, evaluating the agreement to ensure that it meets minimum standards of fair 
and equitable distribution. See id. at 297–98. 
 208 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmts. 29–33. 
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nary case-by-case operation of Rule 1.7 that requires justification. In the sec-
tion that follows, I explain why such categorical treatment of divorcing cou-
ples is unsound. 
3. Rejecting the Categorical Approach 
In the framework provided by Rules 1.2 and 1.7, joint representation can 
only take place where each member of the couple knowingly and voluntarily 
agrees to it. They are likely to be the best source of knowledge about whether 
such an arrangement serves their interests. The question for the legal profes-
sion, then, is this: why should we treat all divorcing couples as unavoidably, 
unconsentably conflicted when they themselves feel otherwise? 
In light of the multiple factors that motivate couples to choose joint repre-
sentation and the lack of satisfactory alternatives, the insistence that all divorc-
ing couples have irrevocably conflicting interests does not withstand scrutiny. 
Consider, for example, the reasoning expressed in the standards of conduct 
promulgated by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, which treat 
joint representation as categorically impermissible. Under the section entitled 
“Conflict of Interest,” Standard 3.1 states that, “[a]n attorney should not repre-
sent both husband and wife even if they do not wish to obtain independent rep-
resentation.”209 A comment explains, “it is impossible for the attorney to pro-
vide impartial advice to both parties. Even a seemingly amicable separation or 
divorce may result in bitter litigation over financial matters or custody. A mat-
rimonial lawyer should not attempt to represent both husband and wife, even 
with the consent of both.”210 
This reasoning and result should be rejected for several reasons. First, the 
comment assumes too much by noting the possibility that a seemingly amica-
ble divorce could result in bitter litigation down the line. The same conse-
quence would result for couples who had chosen collaborative divorce process, 
with the consequence that both attorneys would have to be disqualified. The 
reasoning further overlooks the possibility that couples who choose joint rep-
resentation—even as compared to those who choose collaborative divorce—
should be treated as a distinct subset of divorcing couples who are particularly 
committed to resolving the divorce without litigation. Additionally, the com-
ment does not account for the possibility that the joint representation itself may 
further reduce the prospect of litigation, precisely because the individual 
spouses are not being advised by attorneys fulfilling the role of a traditional 
partisan advocate.  
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In any event, the assertion that a lawyer cannot provide impartial advice 
to both husband and wife misses the mark because impartial advice constitutes 
exactly the kind of advice, and the only kind of advice, that is available to cou-
ples choosing joint representation.211 As previously discussed, an attorney can 
provide guidance about divorce law in a way that does not favor the interests 
of one spouse at the expense of the other.212 There is a great deal that can be 
usefully explained to a divorcing couple from an impartial stance about the law 
that governs the dissolution of marriage. And while it is indisputable that the 
reach of this advice is considerably more circumscribed than what an attorney 
would offer to a divorcing individual in a full-scale representation, we should 
trust that divorcing couples seek joint representation, with this inevitable limi-
tation, because they place a higher value on the benefits they get in exchange – 
in cost savings, speed, and reduced acrimony.213  
What a lawyer cannot provide to both husband and wife is partisan advice 
– advice about how to maximize one party’s position in the dissolution over 
the objection of the other. A lawyer dispensing partisan advice identifies the 
facts that form a point of weakness for the other party on a disputed issue, and 
explains to the client how to use these facts to force concessions in negotiation 
or enhance the likelihood of success in litigation.  
The argument for joint representation is premised upon the view that there 
is a difference between these two modes of legal advice, that practicing attor-
neys can ascertain the difference, and that clients can benefit from impartial 
advice even if they do not have access to the full scope of partisan advice 
available in a traditional representation. Although the lawyer is limited by her 
neutrality as between the two spouses, she is an expert advocate for their 
shared interests, and as such has much to offer. 
 It bears emphasis just how substantial these shared interests are: mini-
mizing transaction costs, maximizing the total value of the marital estate at the 
time of the dissolution, and reducing the negative impact of the divorce on any 
children. The legal profession should not presume—irrebuttably, no less—that 
these interests are of lesser consequence to divorcing spouses than their con-
flicting interests, or that the gains from sharing counsel are less than the gains 
that can be recognized by pursuit of each spouse’s individual interests. At the 
very core of limited scope representation is the idea that clients should be able 
to make this kind of trade-off, benefitting from limited legal assistance even if 
they cannot or do not wish to obtain the full package of legal services. If indi-
vidual clients seeking assistance for a business venture or an employment mat-
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 213 See supra notes 134–150 and accompanying text. 
1144 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1099 
ter can be trusted to make this decision knowingly, rationally, and in their own 
self-interest, divorcing spouses should be able to as well.  
 It seems that the ready rejoinder would emphasize something categori-
cally different about a married couple seeking to dissolve their union. Upon 
close examination, however, the apparent distinction starts to break down, 
placing too much weight on marital status and making it overly conclusive in 
the conflicts analysis. We can see this when we reflect on the joint representa-
tion of married couples in estate planning or small business matters. Consider, 
for example, a hypothetical that ethics and estate planning scholars have grap-
pled with repeatedly.214 A married couple’s request to have the same lawyer 
draft identical wills for each of them appears to present no immediate concern 
that would bar the lawyer from proceeding.215 As it turns out, the wife confides 
in the lawyer that she secretly objects to some of the provisions but does not 
want to initiate marital discord by raising her concerns with her husband.216 
While she instructs the lawyer to proceed with the wills as planned, the lawyer 
must grapple with the ethical implications of having learned that the wills do 
not reflect the individual preferences of one client. 
The hypothetical has inspired a number of different insights about the 
proper role of a lawyer in representing intact families.217 Professor Thomas 
Shaffer criticizes the norm of radical individualism that obscures the im-
portance of family relationships and refuses to recognize the lawyer’s obliga-
tions to the family unit.218 Professor Russell Pearce proposes a model of “op-
tional family representation,” in which clients can choose whether to be repre-
sented as a collection of individuals or as a family group.219 Professor Alyssa 
Rollock, by contrast, asserts that lawyers “should treat spouses and family 
members as autonomous individuals with potentially conflicting interests as 
well as common goals.”220 Professor Patrick Baude suggests that we treat the 
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2014] Counsel for the Divorce 1145 
family as “an economic institution with ongoing rules of its own, and as such, 
as an entity entitled to have a lawyer in just the way a partnership is entitled to 
have a lawyer.”221 
These diverse perspectives reveal that while the joint representation of 
married spouses in estate planning has been the subject of considerable debate, 
it does not engender the same categorical rejection confronting the joint repre-
sentation of divorcing spouses.222 Scholars and practitioners tend to assume 
that married couples have convergent interests, whether in regards to estate 
planning, running the family business, or other matters, until the married cou-
ple demonstrates otherwise.223  
Perhaps it is similarly reasonable to assume that divorcing couples have 
divergent interests—after all, the failure of their marriage may very well pro-
duce irreconcilably conflicting interests to match the irreconcilable differences 
that form the basis for their divorce.224 Couples should at least have the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate otherwise, however. As Professor Terry O’Neil suggests, 
an attorney best serves a family when she “asks specific questions about the 
particularized dynamics of the family she is being asked to represent.”225 Alt-
hough the point was made with regard to intact families, the reasoning holds 
true as well for families in the midst of dissolution. As discussed throughout 
this Article, the financial and emotional upheaval caused by a divorce provides 
compelling reasons to minimize transaction costs, maximize the value of the 
marital estate, and reduce the adversarial dynamics that are so harmful to chil-
dren.226 
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Assuming the unity of interests between married clients and the adversity 
of interests between divorcing spouses vests too much presumptive force in the 
clients’ current and intended marital status. Married people cheat on, lie to, and 
steal from their spouses without ever intending to end the marriage, acting in 
ways that threaten if not destroy the set of joint interests they share with their 
spouses.227 Divorcing spouses, on the other hand, can and sometimes do ap-
proach the end of their marriage with a common purpose, as paradoxical as 
that seems.228 The fact that they no longer wish to be married does not neces-
sarily mean that they cannot agree on how the restructuring of their financial 
and parental relationships should take place. Although this stance may appear 
both overly pessimistic about marriage and overly optimistic about divorce, the 
perspective I urge is ultimately one of agnosticism and humility. The legal pro-
fession simply does not know enough about the individual family to presume 
one way or another. Fortunately, our existing framework for evaluating con-
flicts of interests does not require such knowledge. It requires only that we ask 
the right questions of the people seeking our help. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1916, seeking confirmation to the U.S. Supreme Court and under fire 
for reportedly having represented multiple clients with conflicting interests, 
Louis Brandeis was said to have justified his conduct on the grounds that he 
had not been functioning in the posture of a traditional partisan advocate.229 
Rather, he asserted, he acted as “counsel for the situation,” attempting to 
“strike a balance between the rights and obligations of each party and then 
work out a solution equitable to all.”230 Although Brandeis was eventually con-
firmed, for some the term became tainted by the sense that it reflected a lapse 
in professional judgment on the part of an otherwise great figure of American 
jurisprudence.231 For others, it remains a salutary term, one that calls to mind 
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excuse” offered by Brandeis when his conduct was challenged. Id. at 1507. The term seems to stretch 
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an image of lawyers as innovators, mediators, harmonizers, and servants of a 
more expansive vision of the good.232 
The need to explore representational models that differ from traditional 
partisan advocacy has only become more acute over the past century. Particu-
larly in domestic relations matters, where the adversarial paradigm is losing 
relevance for most families, it is time to consider whether lawyers can serve as 
“counsel for the divorce,” bringing to bear their skills as advisors, mediators, 
drafters, problem-solvers, and process managers. 
As demonstrated here, the existing mechanisms for delivering legal ser-
vices to divorcing spouses have significant shortcomings, which should inform 
our assessment of joint representation. The failures of existing models should 
not blind us to the risks and pitfalls of joint representation, which is not for 
everyone, but neither should one assume that divorcing spouses necessarily 
have such profoundly conflicting interests that the same attorney cannot repre-
sent them. In fact, the set of interests divorcing spouses can share—in mini-
mizing transaction costs, maximizing the value of the marital estate, and reduc-
ing hostility and acrimony—may substantially outweigh the ways in which 
their interests conflict. 
The error lies in vesting marital status—or, more precisely, the intent to 
undo marital status—with conclusive force in the conflicts analysis. The con-
flict of interest rules treat very few fact patterns in this categorical way, instead 
taking a fact-sensitive approach. Divorce should be no exception. Couples who 
believe that their interests are best served by engaging one attorney to manage 
the legal issues surrounding their divorce may very well be correct. 
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